1st Preliminary Issue

# THEOLOGY Digest

DECEMBER, 1951

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Briefs and ACCURATE CONDENSATIONS OF THE BEST FROM THEOLOGICAL JOURNALS

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# THEOLOGY
## *Digest*

December 1, 1951

Dear Father Sheerin, P.C.

Here at St. Mary's this month we are publishing the first issue of a new magazine, Theology Digest, which I think you will be interested in. I am sending you a copy under separate cover. On the first page you will find a statement of our aims.

This publication is for the educated Catholic, whether cleric or layman, who is interested in theology. Our digests will cover the best of all current theological literature, especially articles of importance in foreign languages which are less available to the American reader.

Our first issue of Theology Digest is multilithed, and is being published on an experimental basis. We would like to know your opinion of our new publication, and how you think it has fulfilled its aims. I am enclosing a questionnaire to help you give your criticisms and suggestions. If you prefer, please send me a letter instead.

Thank you for your interest in the Digest. I shall be looking forward to hearing from you as soon as it is convenient.

Sincerely in Christ,

Cyril Vollert S.J.

Cyril O. Vollert, S.J.

We hope to print the next issue.

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*Introducing*

# THEOLOGY DIGEST

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The inauguration of **Theology Digest** is based on the belief that a considerable number of priests, seminarians, and educated Catholic laity in this country are interested in present-day theological thought. Unfortunately, this interest has been stifled in most cases by two things: the quantity of current theological publication is so vast that it is impossible to read even a fair-sized portion of it, and most theological writing is done in some language other than English.

**Theology Digest** hopes to remove these two barriers by presenting in short, readable form the best of the theological thought that is contained in current periodicals. Thorough reading of most of the theological journals of Europe and America will precede the choice of articles to be digested. Careful translation and condensation will be aimed at representing the thought of the original article accurately and succinctly.

As its name indicates, this new magazine will be devoted exclusively to digests of outstanding articles. No original articles will be printed, and no books will be reviewed. The digests will deal with all the various branches of theological learning, though **Theology Digest** will emphasize the speculative rather than the pastoral aspects of theology. The reader of **Theology Digest** will not obtain a complete coverage of what is being accomplished in theological circles, but he will be kept aware of the more significant contributions.

During the first year or so of its existence **Theology Digest** will be published on an experimental basis. The difficulties involved in developing a satisfactory method of selecting and condensing articles demand such a trial period, particularly since accuracy of thought and expression is so important in theology.

In this experimental period **Theology Digest** will be issued for private circulation only, and no subscriptions will be taken. Copies of the experimental issues of **Theology Digest** will be sent to a representative cross-sectional group for their criticism and suggestions. It is hoped that these critics will frankly evaluate the objective of the magazine, the interest of the articles selected, the readability and accuracy of the digests, and that they will make any suggestions which they think would improve **Theology Digest**.

With some pride and much humility we present the first issue of **Theology Digest**.

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# The Historical Background Of Humani Generis

G. Weigel, S.J.

**Since Pope Pius XII** published the Encyclical, "Humani generis," on August 12, 1950, it has been commented on and explained as very few encyclicals have. Before the Encyclical can be properly understood, it is necessary to study the situation it contemplates. This study wishes to discuss the ground from which sprang the theology criticized by the Pope.

In order to do this, a triple task must be essayed: first, a consideration of the possible dynamisms that can influence Catholic theologians; second, a rapid gaze at the record of theological contributions made by some modern Catholics in vital contact with French existentialism; third, an indication of the effects of French existentialism on Catholic theology by reason of inner logic.

The theologian is, like any other man, conditioned by his time, and he cannot escape its influence. But Catholic theology by reason of its necessary attachment to tradition is most conservative. When innovations appear, there will always be opposition, not because the theologian is not of his time, but because he is very sensitive to the possible change in the data of his discipline. In this concern, the theologian is no different from the thinkers in other fields who demand that the data be not transformed or mutilated.

In theology, because of the structure of human beings, there will always be certain tendencies at work. There will be the trend on the part of some to make of revelation one element to be fitted into a philosophic scheme conceived independently of faith. The Gnostics of old exhibited this tendency which ultimately reduces theology to mere philosophy.

There is another form of theologizing found in men like Origen. It is superficially similar to the preceding but substantially quite different. Revelation is itself taken as the source of a framework for all truth, as a scheme of philosophical inquiry. The definitely historical elements in revelation are interpreted as allegorical expressions of general abstract vision. Instead of a literal understanding of the propositions of revelation, it is supposed that these are really symbols of hidden truth rather than narrations of events or formulas for concrete behavior.

A third tendency is the mystic's contempt for intellectual categorization. Here revelation is used as a stimulus for meditation by men who seek for experimental achievement of truth.

The extreme opposite is the thinking that was current among the theologians of the late 14th and 15th centuries. These men were logicians, interested almost exclusively in the logical connection of concepts derived from revelation. They produced a schematic theology that passed over substance in its eager search for logical form.

The Protestant Reformers used a fifth kind of theology. It takes a critical approach to the data of revelation, which is identified with Scripture. On this foundation, using only common-sense principles of reason, it erects a very simple scheme. No profundity is reached, and its fruit is moral endeavor

**Father Weigel's** original article appeared in the **Theological Studies** for June, 1951. The author is professor of theology at Woodstock College, Woodstock, Md.

rather than spiritual insight.

I submit that these five tendencies are always at work in the efforts of theologians. A given age, by reason of the problems it faces, is more propitious to one tendency than to another. The best theologian would be he who could successfully blend all the virtues in all five tendencies, while avoiding the defects in each.

To understand the events of 1950 we must go back to 1900. Catholic theology was a strange thing in the general atmosphere of Hegelianism and positivism, for it did not speak the language of the times. Baron Friedrich von Hugel, an energetic man deeply interested in his Catholic religion, gathered around him thinkers like Tyrell, Bremond and Loisy who were dissatisfied with the static theology of their day.

Modernism, as the theology of the von Hugel group was called, had two elements, one positive and one negative. The negative element was a dissatisfaction with a theology occupied with erecting a static skeleton of Christian dogma whose members were rigidly connected one with the other by logical terms functioning exclusively through Aristotelian dialectic. The Modernists had the impression that current theology was merely an exercise in syllogistic reasoning. On the affirmative side, positivistic historical method had had a great impact on their minds. By it the supernatural simply disappeared. Not finding any justification of Catholic claims in this historical method, they looked to Hegelianism to give them a way out. Behind history was an immanent reality. God, and by inward contemplation the individual could find this undefinable God in Himself. In this way Catholic dogmas could be justified; for as symbols of a richer reality than history could discover, they could be understood with the immediacy of religious experience.

The effect of the condemnation of Modernism was highly salutary and purifying. Yet the very success of the condemnation brought with it something not wholly desirable. The discontent many theologians felt with the state of their discipline could not now be voiced because it exposed them to the danger of being considered Modernists. On the other hand, the entrenched method of treating dogma with superficially positive approaches and of rationalistically coordinating the data with logically constructed terms now claimed magisterial canonization.

By 1914 the whole world was interested in things other than theology. When World War I ended it had dethroned Hegelianism, and the post-war years discarded nineteenth-century positivism and historicism. Soren Kierkegaard was rediscovered by the Protestants, and Albert Einstein and Max Planck gave physical science a new background. Thinkers had to reflect seriously to find out what science was,

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**Because of the importance** to theology of the Encyclical "Humani Generis," much of the theological writing during the past months has dealt with this papal letter. For that reason **Theology Digest** presents a group of five articles that should give a well-rounded picture of the Encyclical, its background, content, purpose, and significance.

Father Weigel's article helps explain the causes that provoked the Encyclical and the Pope's purpose in issuing it. Father Tayman's article on the Encyclical and theology and Father Labourdette's "The Meaning of the Encyclical" were chosen as representative commentaries on the Pope's letter because they clearly point out the Encyclical's meaning for theology.

A key topic of the Encyclical is the correct notion of progress in theology. Prior to the Encyclical, this question was the subject of lively dispute, and a focal point of the controversy was the exchange of views between the editors of **Revue Thomiste** and the Jesuits of the Lyons-Fourviere theologate. In reply to several criticisms by **Revue Thomiste** editors, the Lyons-Fourviere Jesuits published a joint rebuttal late in 1946 in the **Recherches de Science Religieuse.** This was answered by Fathers Labourdette and Nicolas in two articles that appeared as a unit in a little brochure **Dialogue Theologique.**

Since these statements seem to epitomize the positions of the two groups, they are given as the second and third articles in our series. It is hoped that this will help clarify the relation of the Encyclical to current theological thought.

after Werner Heisenberg in the 20's denied the universal applicability of the principle of determinism. Protestant theology dropped the historical approaches of Harnack, and Karl Barth went back to the Scriptures and derived therefrom a luring personal revelation.

In the 30's under the general spell of self-examination, theology began to reflect on itself to see just what it was and with what it was working. Two questions were in the forefront: what is the science of faith, and what is faith. Three names of an earlier period must be mentioned as antecedents to this re-examination.

#### Rousselot's solution

Pierre Rousselot, S. J., in **The Intellectualism of St. Thomas,** had indicated one solution to the problem of rationalism in Scholastic theology. As he saw it, for St. Thomas the intellectual assent in judgment was a dynamic grasp of the real, and not a mere systematizing of concepts. This notion of dynamism, introduced earlier by Blondel, was not considered revolutionary. Then, in his studies on the psychology of faith, Rousselot produced the theory that without an illumination attached to the grace of faith it was impossible to see the naturally certain ground for making the act of faith. Rousselot did not say, as the Modernists had, that the historical events supposed in Christian revelation could not be verified by the historical method, but on theological grounds he would not admit that the natural could achieve the "supernatural."

The second name is that of Ambroise Gardeil, O.P., whose work was done in the early part of the century but was being reexamined in the early 30's. He was directly interested in the nature of the theological enterprise, and proposed dynamic Thomism as the true theological method.

Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P., the third man to help develop the present situation, insisted that St. Thomas taught, and he himself was certainly teaching, that in communicating revelation the Church was not restricted to the logical analysis of preexisting propositions, but could extend received dogmas in the light of truth achieved empirically or metaphysically, even though such truth was not formally contained in the primitive propositions.

"Vitalism" in theology became widespread in the 30's. This was due in part to the interest of the 20's in the notion of the Mystical Body. On every side the Church was portrayed as the vital theandric unity of all Catholics in and with Christ. The presentation of the Church exclusively as a monarchic society with a juridical framework was no longer popular, though no one denied it.

By the end of the 30's when war interrupted theorizing, there were clear manifestations of an expansion of vitalism to all fields of theology. One of the first champions was Yves de Montcheuil, S.J., who died in the War. Less militant but just as important was Louis Charlier, O.P., whose most conspicuous contribution, **Essai sur le probleme theologique,** was placed on the Index in 1942.

#### Post-war movements

At the close of the war three Jesuits, Henri de Lubac, Jean Danielou, and Henri Bouillard, emerged in the limelight. The Jesuits were paralleled by a Dominican trio: M. D. Chenu, Yves Congar, and Andre Dubarle. One splendid result of the ferment among French Jesuits and Dominicans was the ecclesiological series, **Unam Sanctam.** However, the product that caused most discussion was de Lubac's work, **Le Surnaturel,** which became with its author the concrete symbol of the movement.

In the other countries of Europe there was sporadic support and criticism of the new movement. In Italy, however, it was watched and attacked vigorously by two Frenchmen, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., and Charles Boyer, S.J., whose renown gave added weight to their opposition.

Nor was Rome asleep. In 1946 the Holy Father in his audience with the General Chapter of the Dominican Order and with the General Congregation of the Jesuits urged both groups to be wary of innovations in theology antagonistic to the constant tradition of the Church. Early in 1950 all over Europe the grapevine reported that action was being taken in Rome against the new ideas and that some kind of a syllabus would be published, and what we

have is the Encylical, "Humani Generis," which mentions no names and condemns no individual.

In this "new" theology, existentialism and Catholic theology had met. The result was not a simple thing, but rather a constellation of disparate elements; and different representatives of the "new" theology grasped at factors in the constellation without worrying about the totality. What united the theologians was a mood rather than a theory. They experienced existentialism as a fact, though they were cold to it as a theory. They knew that existentialism was deep reaction to a kind of thinking which they found prominent in Catholic theology, and which they wished to drop. The theologians themselves could not tell us just how existentialism influenced them at each step. It will be better to see what effects existentialism must have by inner logic, even though such effects were never intended, never consciously admitted, never clearly present in the writers' thoughts.

### Existentialism defined

To give a simple definition of existentialism is not easy. Still it might not be too misleading a simplification to state that it is a doctrine that takes a bold stand in metaphysics by declaring that the real is only that which exists, and the human existent is a striving to transcend himself in anguish without the possibility of help from any absolute—God or an order or reality which can be called ideal or essential. The striving is blind and is the core of existence. Thinking is an instance of this striving; thought, then, can only show existence, but it cannot show existence any goal. This doctrine is really a shut-in theory isolating the subject absolutely—a rare form of the philosophy of immanence. The subject knows himself, and knows himself to be utterly contingent, which is freedom. Everything beyond the subject is known only in its "I" relevance.

Existentialism of this type is an extreme voluntarism that denies all truly metaphysical knowledge. It cannot be reconciled as such with Catholicism. However, Catholics living in an atmosphere where existentialism is the prevailing wind, may try to move along with it as far as a Catholic context will permit. They will try to adopt existentialist postures with the hope of transcending existentialist theory.

A Catholic with existentialist preoccupations will find the consideration of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, a living, human thing, very congenial. On the contrary, a legalistic consideration of the Church as an abstractly-fixed juridical institution will be annoying.

The presentation of the act of faith in the early years of this century was an attempt to make the act of faith simultaneously a rational assent commanded by logic, and a grace-inspired, free assent. In the face of this confusing picture a theologian in an existentialist climate will try boldly to drop out the rationalistic element in the act. To meet the demands of Catholic dogma, which insists that a certain knowledge of God on the natural plane as well as a humanly certain recognition of the historical fact of divine revelation must precede the act of faith, different solutions are proposed.

### Faith and reason

The most radical solution, that of Rousselot, proposed that the grace of faith, free and contingent, has a double function; one looks backward so that the sufficiency of the evidence for God's appearance in history is guaranteed, and the other looks forward, so that the act of faith can be placed. Consequently, while the historical arguments proposed as rational proof for the fact of revelations are valid objectively, the admission is modified by the assertion that no human subject would be convinced by them alone. His intelligence must be elevated by free grace, and with a higher kind of intellectual assent he will then see the divine event toward which the arguments point.

For the understanding of faith itself the existentialist-minded theologican takes a new approach. The verbal expression of revelation, the proposition, holds a fuller truth than is conveyed by words, and this fuller truth is achieved by vital intuitions tangled up with the existentialist striving for transcendence. There is an inclination to consider the proposition and the concepts as symbolic representations of a great truth which must be lived rather than reduced to

logical categories. In Scripture the divine message is given primarily through the mystical sense; hence a return to the Fathers to understand their development of the mystical or symbolic interpretation of Scripture.

The reformation of Church dogmas necessitated by this outlook is a dangerous task, because we must be sure that the new formula actually carries with it the truth expressed in the old. By comparing the formulas of the Fathers in order to see how the same truth is expressed from different philosophical points of view, the theologian finds out what is mere temporal terminology, and is able to express the truth equivalently in the philosophical scheme congenial to his time. Thus the Church's teaching is always contemporaneous and vital.

However, in the light of existentialist thinking the actual religious strivings of the Catholic and the consequent behavior are more important than dogmas or Scripture. All human life is Catholic and supernatural in the sense that God always breaks into it, just as He did spectacularly in the Incarnation. In some sense it is impossible for man to be without this constant visitation of God, who is alone man's satisfaction, to be achieved in the final act of transcendence wherein man will enter into the union with God which will end isolation and loneliness.

But this very divinization of Catholic life carries with it the dangerous possibility that the Catholic can become so inward in his belief and piety that he really nullifies both the magisterium and the regimen, because he understands them not as they were meant but in the terms of his own inner life. Such Catholic inwardness can easily separate the Catholic from the Church's external authority, doctrinal and jurisdictional.

All these factors enter into the background of the Encylical, "Humani Generis."

As a final observation it will not be irrelevant to remind all that the example of the pontifical pronouncement is worth following. No individuals are to be attacked. The men engaged in the movement were and are sterling Catholics. The best proof of it is that not one has left the Church and not one has relinquished his Catholic mission of working on in theology, the science of the real as illuminated by faith.

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"Truth and its philosophic expression cannot change from day to day, least of all where there is question of self-evident principles of the human mind or of those propositions which are supported by the wisdom of the ages and by divine revelation. Whatever new truth the sincere human mind is able to find, certainly cannot be opposed to truth already acquired, since God, the highest Truth, has created and guides the human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones, but rather that, having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth. Let no Christian therefore, whether philosopher or theologian, embrace eagerly and lightly whatever novelty happens to be thought up from day to day, but rather let him weigh it with painstaking care and a balanced judgment, lest he lose or corrupt the truth he already has, with grave danger and damage to his faith."

Pope Pius XII, "Humani Generis."

# Theolgy And Its Sources

## Lyons-Fourviere

**Father Labourdette** attacks a number of related errors, most of which involve a denial of absolute objective truth. He denounces the "pseudo-philosophy" that would "replace the metaphysical notion of speculative truth wtih the more modest one of historical truth," and thus bring about a "perpetual remolding of our concepts of God."

He takes care to specify that he does not attribute to us the "theory" which he refutes; that his anathemas are not launched against us; that he hesitates to accuse us even of a tendency to this error. For all practical purposes, however, he does actually accuse us of such a tendency.

Since we cannot doubt the good faith or the benevolence of the author, we are forced to seek an explanation for this strange phenomenon. The explanation lies in his method.

The first error of this method is its extreme anxiety. Our author finds signs of the monster of heresy on all sides. If this monster is real, why does he not describe its nature? Why does he not attack it, instead of molesting poor passers-by? In other words, why does he not refute the works which profess the doctrine he denounces, instead of casting suspicion on an entirely different series of writings?

The second error of Father Labourdette's method is that of interpreting the works of one author according to the writings of another, without taking pains to analyze either. We do not deny that a fraternal bond unites us as members of one family. But each of us is none the less independent in his work. We are aware of numerous differences among us in method and thought, and only a lack of insight could allow our critic to generalize on what he believes to have discovered, all too erroneously, to be common among us.

This method of global presentation leads our author to suspect hidden intentions in works that he admits are irreprehensible. This is the abyss of subjectivism. Why be astonished, then, that he detects a dangerous meaning in the most incontestable assertion, and that to him all ideas seem a tendency to error?

His manner of attacking a "tendency" reminds us of an anecdote: "Unfortunate man," said the prudent one to his friend, "beware of proclaiming without precaution that there are three Persons in God! The least exaggeration might lead you to say that there are four. And in fact, in speaking of three do you not already manifest a tendency to say four? Rather say simply that there are two."

We could have denied, against the evidence of history and reason, that there has been any relativism in the development of man's thought. Thus we would not have given our censor any hold on us. But would we actually have treated the subjects which we claimed to be treating? Each of us merits the reproach of tending to relativism about as much as the affirmation of three Persons in God merits the charge of tending to the admission of four.

These remarks lead us to the radical issue which we do not wish to avoid.

Father Labourdette does not profess "any disdain" for the first twelve centuries of Christian thought. However,

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Several Jesuits from Lyons-Fourviere collaborated on this article which is taken from Recherches de Science Religieuse, December, 1946. See page 3.

he seems to appreciate them only in so far as they have been drained of their substance by the synthesis of St. Thomas. And since this synthesis "represents the truly scientific age in Christian thought," and since all its categories are eternal, the attempt to search in remote times for some directly assimilable intellectual nourishment would show "evident depreciation" of this synthesis.

Such a conception explains why our critic takes scandal when we revivify the writings of Christian antiquity.

Theological progress is not as simple a thing as one supposes. The very character of scientific systematization carries with it some amount of choice and partiality. Why then should one so vehemently resent the statement that Thomism lacks a certain sense of history? Such is the case with all medieval thought.

**Living theology needed**

This does not mean that one cannot find in such a system principles that can provide the basis for new developments. But it shows that to remain living theology, that system must keep growing.

Usually a "rigorous scientific expression of Christian thought" leaves out some elements of a more concrete order. For a complete grasp of Catholic tradition one should draw from many sources. It is a law of the mind that rectilinear progression from conclusion to conclusion does not suffice for true progress; one must return periodically to the sources of his thought.

Permit us a comparison: No one would suggest that, since the riches of Scripture are contained in the current teaching of the Church, there is no need to go back to the Scriptures. Does not the Church herself urge us to study those Sacred Books now and always? The Fathers do not have the same authority, but they nonetheless play a capital role, not only in literary history, but also as ever-living sources.

The complaint of our critic can be summed up in one word: anti-intellectualism. The word is equivocal. To its single substantive form correspond two adjective forms: anti-intellectual and anti-intellectualistic. None of us admits being the first; concerning the second we must distinguish.

We unhesitatingly oppose that intellectualism which tends to treat Christian Revelation as the communication of a system of ideas, rather than the manifestation of a Person. Christ is at once the bearer and the object of the divine message. It does not follow that revelation should not be expressed in concepts. But it follows that Catholic truth will always overflow its conceptual expression, and much more so its scientific systematization.

This fact, accorded all the attention that it merits, would have urged our critic to show himself more benign toward trends of thought other than his own. In theology more than elsewhere, we must fear this intellectualism which identifies one system with the truth, or even conceives truth itself as a system.

**Negative criticism**

If one understands by intellectualism "a doctrine which places the very essence of being in the act of intelligence" (Rousselot), such a conception can be disputed, but it cannot be objected to on grounds of faith.

We face entirely negative criticism, which takes no account of facts proposed, which retains of each work cited nothing but what could lead to an erroneous system, which includes general statements that are not, but seem to be, against us. We are continually charged with heterodoxy.

So serious is the accusation and so vast its scope that we feel justified in demanding whether it was made with reflection.

Our wish is that henceforth we may be able to collaborate with our critic in the service of the same truth, without excluding legitimate differences and peaceful discussions. We hope to be his comrades in the defense of the faith. But we believe that the best defense is a positive attitude.

# Criticism and Progress In Theology

M.-M. Labourdette, O.P.
M.-J. Nicolas, O.P.

**In the interest** of the present dispute it seems worth our while to reflect on certain general principles that justify criticism in theology. It will also be profitable to consider the advantages or disadvantages of certain methods of criticism whose validity has been questioned.

My critics reproach me for having instituted a trial of orthodoxy. I did say that certain assertions, pushed to their conclusions, did not seem compatible with the teachings of the Church. Now these teachings are the very principles of theology, and it is difficult to see how there could be a theological discussion if one did not have the right to compare a writer's conclusions with these basic principles. How else could one uncover the lack of logic in a theological argumentation? What is there to criticize in a philosopher unless he has observed or reasoned poorly and consequently presented conclusions that can be censured as illogical? To criticize him for such things is not to question his sanity. So also, to criticize a theologian is not to question his orthodoxy.

One of the most precise objections brought against me is that of following a defective method. It seems that by a "prepossession of mind" I have invented a monstrous heresy; I go in search of traces of it in the most varied writings; I interpret these writings one by another, "without taking the trouble to analyze any one of them." Need I say that in my opinion an investigation conducted in such a spirit would not have the right to be discussed? To show that my method does not merit this criticism, I will briefly outline the course of my work.

When, after the war, the collection **Sources** appeared, I thoroughly approved and was most grateful to those who began this collection. I have never revoked these sentiments. Not that I was even then without reservations. The very introduction of the first volume seemed to me so evidently written with a view to please, so careful to show a connection with "modern categories," so interested in directing the reader to something other than the enriching contact with an admirable text. I regretted this too "apologetic" bent as a danger to the collection. As the volumes appeared there was gradually amassed a set of ideas that seemed to pose a more general question: that of the relation of our evolved theology to its sources.

Meanwhile, the collection **Theologie** began to appear. In the first volume, Father Bouillard devoted a section to the general problem of the evolution of Christian thought. His treatment seemed most obscure, but on one point it was clear: the historical position of St. Thomas, since it differs radically from that of modern theology, is not true today.

In the second volume, Father Danielou wished to show that certain sections of the Platonic framework of thought had been thoroughly reconceived and regrasped by Gregory of Nyssa, so much

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**This answer** to "Theology and its Sources" was printed in a brochure **Dialogue Theologique** (Paris, 1947) published by **Revue Thomiste.** Both authors are Dominicans, editors of **Revue Thomiste,** and prominent French Thomists. The first section of this article is by Father Labourdette and was originally entitled "Criticism in Theology." See page 3.

so that they became purely and simply Christian. I remarked that, in his reasoning, Father Danielou definitely minimized conceptual structure of thought. Instead he emphasized the authenticity of experience, and delighted to speak of symbolism.

In the third volume of the collection **Theologie**, Father de Lubac undertook to show from history the ancient meaning of the expression **Corpus Mysticum.** He synthesized ideas dear to him, particularly those which concern the place of symbolism in ancient thought. He described the age of scholasticism as a time when theology became rationalistic, a great misfortune for theology. Thomism, the most brilliant fruit of this scholastic method, was itself only a beginning, and was later surpassed in rationalistic dryness.

**No "heresy" seen**

Perhaps now one can understand why the idea occurred to me to speak of the collections **Sources Chretiennes** and **Theologie** in the same critical study. It is purely and simply false to say that I began by seeing "a monstrous heresy arising before my eyes" and then looked for it everywhere, even in books which had not the vaguest resemblance to this heresy. I wrote a review devoted to the problem of the relations between theology and its sources, a problem that concerns the progress and permanence of theology. Among these authors there was an objective convergence toward this same problem of theology and its sources. The anathema hurled against my "global presentation" of their position does not convince me that my method was faulty. However, it is quite clear that the debate is deeper and concerns questions of greater moment. My criticism mentions my "grave anxieties" —with good reason! My work was already close to completion (and written in a different tone) when I saw the article of Father Danielou in the **Etudes** of April, 1946. I read: "Faced with the danger of agnosticism, neo-Thomism has once again denounced theological rationalism." A little further: "The assault of modernism had to be stopped. Neo-Thomism and the Biblical Commission were the parapets that accomplished this. But it is quite clear that these parapets were not replies."

Alongside these scornful evaluations I saw again that desire to appeal to modern thought which I had discovered earlier in the same author's introduction to the **Vie de Moise:** "Theoretical speculations that are separated from action and divorced from life have had their day." We find no fault with action and life. However, it would be a grave loss for Christian thought if we forgot that knowledge as such is ordained to a speculative goal; to agree with existentialism and Marxism on the finality of knowledge would be most regrettable.

Father Danielou frequently complains that Thomism and scholastic thought are closed to history. By this he evidently means that reflection on history can be integrated with present-day Christian thought on one condition: that a philosophy completely different from Thomism be used. The great sin of scholastic thought (and therefore of Thomistic thought) is that it treats God as an "object," whereas He is "the subject par excellence."

Can we be indifferent to such statements, we who profess Thomism and do not conceal our interest in "theoretical speculation separated from action"? Are we to thank the author for the sympathy he shows; are we to accept the picture he draws of Thomism's future? A beautiful piece for a museum, as little adapted to present-day needs of the mind as the heavy armor of the old knights is to modern war.

**Ideas converge**

I do not attribute to all these authors all the ideas of each one, nor do I suspect any previous accord. I speak of objective convergence of ideas and expressions toward the idea that Thomism is not adapted to contemporary difficulties, that scholastic theology has had its day, that modern philosophy alone can give theology the means of elaborating the faith, that theology has never attained the status of a true science, and that we must literally create a new theology.

Since my critics ask me to explain myself in detail, I maintain, until the contrary has been demonstrated:

1. That the collections **Sources Chretiennes** and **Theologie** complement each other in a common effort whose purpose is substantially excellent.

2. That the collection **Sources Chrétiennes** has as its purpose to highlight the "categories of contemporary thought which scholastic theology has lost." This is the same as wishing to show the inadequacy of scholastic theology in today's world.

3. That Father Danielou, in his article in **Etudes**, speaks of Thomism and scholastic theology in general as a stage of Christian thought that is obsolete today. This explains their inability to assimilate the new categories, in particular those of history and of subjective experience which existentialism expresses.

4. That the way in which Father Danielou speaks of the relations between systems of theology and diverse spiritualities leads one to think that theological expression should be measured by the religious experience of the theologian, and not by the object that is being described. This directs the very notion of speculative truth away from the classic definition of conformity to an object and toward the idea of conformity with subjective life. I am glad to know that Father Danielou himself does not hold this view. But I maintain that his formulas cannot be explained objectively except as tending in this direction.

5. That Father de Lubac's two books, **Corpus Mysticum** and **Introduction aux homelies d'Origene**, manifest again that intent which I have described, the first by presenting the introduction of dialectics into theological reflection as an impoverishment of thought, the second by making a plea for a return to symbolism, this time in exegesis. I do not denounce any heresy or exorbitant claim. I only say that these conclusions are debatable, and that objectively they follow the same line of thought that I had noticed before, particularly in the writings of Father Danielou.

6. That Father Bouillard's book presents in its conclusion a general theory of the evolution of theology which ends, contrary to his declared intentions, in denying the permanent value of theological science and even of dogmatic formulas.

7. That the idea of Father Fessard's book is evidently this: in today's world the instrument to be used in elaborating Christian doctrine is the metaphysics of Hegel, not that of St. Thomas.

8. That Father von Balthasar, speaking of the present-day tasks of theology, represents theology as something to be remade for our times and in a completely new manner.

9. That Father Danielou's article in **Etudes** considerably increased the evidence of an objective convergence of these different works toward a new conception of scholastic theology.

The Reverend Fathers agree that we should renounce this polemical discussion and consecrate ourselves to the magnificent tasks His Holiness Pope Pius XII recently proposed to us. We join them in this desire, and we will be happy if we can help them. But we do not think that all discussion is sterile. And if it is true, as the Holy Father assures us, that a certain "new theology" is leading minds astray, it is a noble task to combat it and to point out the permanent fecundity of traditional theology.

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Though the following section written by Father Nicolas was originally a distinct article entitled "Progress in Theology and Fidelity to St. Thomas," it appeared together with Father Labourdette's article in **Dialogue Theologique**, and the two are clearly meant to complement one another. Whereas Father Labourdette uses a polemical approach, Father Nicolas stresses the positive position of the **Revue Thomiste** editors.

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Let us leave our critical study and ask ourselves what is, in the last analysis, the Reverend Fathers' position with regard to St. Thomas and theology.

Let us see what they mean by fidelity to St. Thomas. It will not exclude the study of the first twelve centuries of Christian thought, nor make of this study merely the history of the genesis of St. Thomas' thought. They will seek in those early ages for directly assimilable Christian nourishment. They will assume progress in the centuries after St. Thomas, and will not fear a "re-

casting" of thought; for St. Thomas' synthesis is not definitive, his categories are not eternal.

Scientific systematization risks an accompanying impoverishment, a partiality. To remain a living theology, Thomism should expand itself and incorporate concrete elements that were abandoned in the struggle for systematization. Return to St. Thomas' sources will permit us to discover in him potentialities which give promise of marvelous developments. The Fathers, like the Holy Scriptures, are ever-living sources.

On all these points we are almost in accord with them. But let us not exaggerate this agreement on what Thomism ought not to be. One would like to see what remains of St. Thomas; and it is on this point that disagreement appears. Only one positive aspect of the Thomistic system is considered, **the intellectualism of St. Thomas.**

They distinguish between intellectualism considered as a doctrine that grants to intellectual activity the highest ontological value (they declare themselves divided on this point), and intellectualism considered as a doctrine that admits the power of the intellect to grasp truth. It is this latter intellectualism which they proudly profess, but with the condition of being rightly understood: They unhesitatingly oppose that intellectualism which tends to make of Christian Revelation the communication of a system of ideas, whereas it is primarily the manifestation of a person.

Let our critics be reassured! We do not profess that sort of intellectualism.

### The question posed

To throw some clarity into the debate, here is the question that ought to be posed: Do you think that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is **true**, not only in so far as it is a hypothesis or an expression of a mentality, but objectively and in reality? The second question is this: Do you think that Christian thinkers should strive to know Thomism so that, through it, the faith can be elaborated in the most complete and universal theology?

To be sure, Revelation is essentially that of a Person, but of a Person who has spoken, who has therefore expressed concepts. These concepts are profoundly involved in all the concreteness of experience, but the Church must disengage them and render them precise.

This requires philosophical reflection and the use of concepts not directly derived from the Word of God, but guaranteed by the Church as apt for expressing the Word of Christ to the human intellect. We are profoundly persuaded that these concepts are at the same time true and insufficient to completely express, not only the Divine Reality, but even the real content of the living Word of Christ. This insufficiency is the cause of the partiality of all theological thought, even that of St. Thomas.

But we do not think that two contradictory theological theses can be true at the same time, except where they do not oppose but rather complement each other. While admitting that there is place for a revision of some of St. Thomas' theses, we think that his is the basic synthesis for every sound theological construction.

### Truth and different systems

We do not believe that the same truth, be it ever so infinite or beyond conception, can be expressed with equal verity by means of fundamentally different metaphysics. Certainly, there are some truths common to the different philosophies Christians have used. But these are few and do not suffice for a perfect theology. The glory and historical significance of St. Thomas are due to the fact that he traced the essential lines of the metaphysics of Christianity.

What would disquiet us most would be that anyone would doubt the very possibility, the objective existence of a Christian metaphysics—and therefore of a scientifically elaborated theology.

To him who would take away from St. Thomas the glorious role we give him, we would not fear to oppose whatever reasons and intellectual abilities we have, so convinced are we that the abandonment of St. Thomas' metaphysics would lead to the ruin of the faith. If Thomistic metaphysics is true, modern thought, which is fundamentally opposed to it, must be convicted of deep-seated evil.

# The Meaning of the Encyclical Humani Generis

M.-M. Labourdette, O.P.

The first set of teachings in the Encyclical deals with the teaching authority of the Church; it recalls and clarifies the position of the Magisterium with respect to the two fundamental sources of Revelation: Sacred Scripture and Tradition.

Revelation, complete in the preaching of Christ and the Apostles, and progressively unfolding in the course of time under the guidance of Divine Wisdom, is a deposit of supernatural truths. This deposit is a living thing that lies at the very heart of the Church's life. Assisted by the Divine Spirit, the Church preserves this deposit unsullied, gains an ever deeper understanding of it, teaches it as it gradually progresses. This progress is not a question of adding new truths, but of unfolding truths still implicitly contained in a deposit that human reflection will never exhaust. The Church, living and divinely guided, remains the sole authority that can judge what those sources contain.

Theology is not guided by these sources of Revelation in their original condition, but by the Church's explanation of them. Neither by the sole means of history and criticism nor by religious experience are we put into contact with these sources that are separated from us by two thousand years; the ever living Church furnishes us with the object of our faith. Once we possess this object of faith as the Church explains it, we can return to the sources in their initial condition—not to use these sources as criteria for judging the Church's explanations, but to clarify these sources in the light of what the Church says is infallibly contained there. To proceed otherwise, in a case where a definite clarification exists, would be to interpret the clear by the obscure; it would be to prefer the unformulated and indistinct to the explicit formulation of the truth.

Let us hasten to add that this return to the sources remains absolutely essential and extremely profitable; it is an absolute law for theology. No matter to what extent Christian thought progresses, the revealed data will always possess unplumbed depths. To renew its youthful vitality and to avoid sterile discussion, theological speculation must scrutinize the content of Revelation and study its development.

Positive theology must not be reduced to a purely historical discipline whose sole task would be to describe the various forms that revealed truth has taken in the course of the centuries. Positive theology is **theology.** Its proximate and universal norm is the living teaching body given by God to the Church. Only if it points out both the homogeneity and the progressive enrichment of doctrine does positive theology give a faithful description of the life of dogma.

Pius XII applies these same principles to the exegesis of Sacred Scripture. He denounces the illusion of those who, using purely rational means to interpret Scripture, then proceed to employ the Scriptures as a norm for judging the teaching of the Fathers and of the Church. Scripture must be interpreted according to the mind of the Church, since to her has been given the deposit of the Scriptures to be guarded, transmitted, and interpreted. A truly Christian exegesis, while it uses methods of

**This article** was published in the first issue of the **Revue Thomiste** in 1950. The author's role in recent controversy adds to the article's interest. See page 3.

natural reasoning, must consider primarily what the Church has determined. This will in no way hinder a literal interpretation of the entire Bible.

The passage in the Encyclical that treats of Scripture requires very careful study; and we must be careful not to apply it too broadly. What is condemned is the pretense of replacing a literal interpretation of Scripture by a so-called spiritual interpretation. Adherents of this "spiritual" interpretation suppose that it alone can solve the difficulties arising from historical criticism. This new exegesis is different from one which admits the primacy of the literal meaning and then goes on to find a true spiritual meaning that may foster Christian piety—such an approach is entirely praiseworthy.

### Conciliar definitions

Not only the sources of revelation are treated in the Encyclical, but also the doctrine that concerns the teaching authority of the Church is reiterated and clarified. Conciliar definitions are guaranteed by strict infallibility and are to be held by the faithful on divine faith. But what of the fact that these definitions have expressed the truths of faith in ideas and words that are drawn not from Scripture but from the various philosophical systems that theologians used? Will not these definitions have a very different meaning, or no meaning at all, in some other philosophical system? Has the Church adopted certain philosophical ideas and incorporated them into her formal definitions? If she has, does this not mean that the authentic statements of faith are chained to philosophical systems that later Christian thinkers may reject? These weighty questions are authoritatively answered by the Supreme Pontiff.

Certain philosophical ideas, tried and tested during years of theological reflection, are used in conciliar definitions. They are not a provisional means of explaining the faith to the men of one epoch, a means that can be later discarded; instead, they have been consecrated and sanctioned by their embodiment in a definition. This does not mean that the Church consecrates the entire philosophical framework in which these ideas had their origin and their fullest development; a concept is not consecrated as Platonic or Aristotelian, Augustinian or Thomistic. In certain philosophical ideas, human reason attains eternal truths; and the Church recognizes in these ideas a more elaborated and technical expression of truths contained in Scripture and Tradition. The revealed truth has not been altered; it has been more distinctly and exactly formulated. Expressions such as "consubstantial" and "transubstantiation" are as authoritative as the corresponding Gospel expressions, and they have an absolute value for all minds, in all places, for all time. Conciliar formularies can be improved, for dogma does progress. This progress, however, is not achieved by substitution but by internal development and increasing precision.

Solemn definitions are not the only way in which the Church's teaching authority is exercised. The ordinary way is in the common teaching of the bishops of the world—united, of course, to the Sovereign Pontiff. The Pope himself, though he possesses the fullness of the Church's teaching authority and can personally define a dogma with complete assurance of infallibility, very rarely teaches in this most solemn fashion. Even in his ordinary teaching he enjoys the assurance of divine assistance, though this does not cover and guarantee all his acts equally. Certainly the promise of divine help extends beyond infallibility in the strict sense; it confers on the Pope's decisions, even when there is no question of infallibility, an exceptional authority which demands the interior obedience of the faithful. When, as in the case of an encyclical, he determines a controverted question, he removes it from further discussion. The truth he teaches becomes authoritative for the theologian. This authority must be weighed and its degree determined; it cannot be doubted.

### Incompatible philosophies

A second group of points concerns human reason, both as engaged with the purely natural knowledge of philosophy and as utilized in theology. What the Encyclical teaches regarding this matter has been treated by the Vatican Council and recent papal documents, but never before with such force and clarity.

The Church allows no one to cast doubt on the ability of the human mind

to reach objective truth, truth that is independent of the mind and whose validity is timeless. Some truths, naturally known, are self-evident principles that cannot be doubted. Every philosophy which implies the negation of these principles is thereby rendered incompatible with Christian dogma. Dogma does not impose any particular philosophy; but, contrary to what many think, not any and every philosophy is consonant with dogma. Among such incompatible philosophies, the Pope first lists **idealism** without distinguishing its various forms. This means that one must admit realism in the sense that thought is measured by things and finds in the stability of their essential connections the immutable foundation of its basic certitudes. Secondly, he names **immanentism** which can develop into an evolutionary monism; its rejection implies the possibility of establishing the existence of a transcendent, personal God, Creator of the world, who from all eternity knows contingent events and free acts, and thus governs the universe by His Providence. The idea of **evolution,** aside from the context of the natural sciences, where it is still the object of study, has been transformed into an entire point of view. It has united those philosophies of becoming which leave no place for the contingence of history or for liberty, and in which the supernatural (at least in the Catholic sense) has no meaning.

### Atheistic existentialism

These theories, to which we may add **pragmatism**, which minimizes the value of the intellect, and **historicism,** which by its notion of relativity has destroyed all truth and all human values—these theories have opened the way to the philosophy which is called **existentialism.** Denying the very foundation of any immutable truth, it occupies itself only with the existence of single beings and with "situations." The Pope points out that not only is atheistic existentialism incompatible with Catholic dogma, but the same is also true of any form of existentialism that denies the validity of metaphysical reasoning.

Pius XII then reiterates the recommendation of his predecessors: the Church wishes those who teach in her name to teach philosophy according to the method and principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. She does not confer any dogmatic authority on this philosophy; she does not exclude the possibility of proposing and solving metaphysical problems in other ways without prejudice to Revelation. One can be a Christian without being a Thomist. But after seven centuries of experience and vigilant examination, she has judged that no other philosophical doctrine is more adapted to the needs of dogma, more helpful in understanding and defending the faith, and at the same time more open to progress and new ideas.

### Faith and reason

Let no one suppose that the Church is opposed to progress in philosophical thought. She wishes only that this be true progress. She opposes the rejection of the thought heritage of the past, and the substitution of some novel and ephemeral "fashion." The progress that she approves and encourages is a progress that is living and organic. She blesses any effort to present the traditional philosophy in an up-to-date manner, so that it will not appear less vital than some other system of thought that endures but for a day.

Human reason was created by God and ordained by Him to truth, and, although it bears the weight of man's fallen state, it is able to grasp with certitude those truths which comprise the preamble to faith. Human reason, aided by Revelation and its influence, is able to develop a true philosophy that is not less the work of reason because it is Christian. Human reason is also capable of forming a rationally certain judgment about the credibility of Revelation, a judgment that rests on the evidence of the criteria that God has given as guarantees of this Revelation. These criteria are intended for human reason, and therefore they must be rationally perceptible regardless of whether one has or has not faith. It is due to this judgment of credibility that the complete attitude of a Christian is the **fidei obsequium rationale,** it is because of it that he can give a rational justification of his faith.

Following the lead of the Vatican Council, Pius XII assigns two great offices to theology: positive theology which assures us that a truth really be-

longs to the deposit of Revelation, tells us how it pertains to that deposit, and describes its gradual clarification; and speculative theology which attempts to deepen the understanding of revealed truths, analyzes and defines the notions used to express these truths, studies the implications of these truths and their relation to one another.

Speculative or scholastic theology, which is blessed and approved by the Church, should aim at deepening the understanding of revealed truths. To do this, it must necessarily use reason, its concepts, its distinctions. This implies no adulteration of the faith, for faith is not lowered to the level of these philosophic concepts; on the contrary, these concepts are elevated by their use in theology so that they help us reach the transcendent reality that is the object of faith.

**The Church as teacher**

Some, forgetting the Church's role as teacher, desire that dogmatic propositions be stripped of whatever appears adventitious or borrowed from philosophy. They would have us return to the formulas of Scripture and the Fathers, restore theological concepts to their proper terminology as found in the Sacred Books. They urge us to discard "human concepts," even when these have been used approvingly by a long theological tradition, even when the Church has consecrated them in her definitions of dogma.

Others, with like forgetfulness, and less care of truth, maintain that human concepts must be used in order to "think dogma," but none of these concepts give us certain truth, only "approximations." For this reason, these concepts can always be replaced by others, even by those which are quite different. In this way, they say, dogma can be presented in ideas appropriate to any cultural milieu. As a result, there will be many theologies, all of them expressed in concepts that are more or less relative, all of them leading us to a truth that in the last analysis is inexpressible.

Both these groups manifest an apostolic intent. Both extend the meaning of dogmas as far as possible: either we obtain a minimum formula to which everyone can agree, or we say that differences in conception are not so important that they cannot be united in one common tendency toward that truth which eludes us all. Both groups err when they try to find in Scripture and the Fathers formulas that will permit unity, and forget that these formulas must be understood in the sense that the living, teaching Church has always given them.

It is not surprising that "harmful consequences in nearly all parts of theology" have resulted from such errors —or, as many would have it, from such waverings—regarding these all-important notions. We can touch upon only a few of the errors catalogued by the Encyclical.

In a philosophical atmosphere where conceptual knowledge is depreciated, rational demonstration of the existence of a personal and creating God is not recognized as absolutely valid. Subjective dispositions of the soul, which unquestionably have considerable influence upon the intellect, are made the basis for certitude in reasoning; and this because the role of these dispositions is confused with the objectively valid working of reason itself.

**Mystical Body: its members**

Denial of the traditional concepts of natural and supernatural leads to the conclusion that a created spirit can be nothing other than an "opening onto God." As a consequence, God could not but ordain man to the Beatific Vision. This is to "destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order" as the Church understands it.

Some claim that the notion of original sin, and the very idea of sin ought to be revised. To conceive sin as an offense against God is mere anthropomorphism. To understand the sacrifice of Christ, therefore, as a satisfaction for this offense would be to revive a primitive religious mentality, which had its value, but which we fortunately are qualified to disregard. The ancient concept is perhaps too consecrated to be completely false, but it is too coarse for our times. We must accommodate ourselves to the more evolved and modern understanding of justice and the inexpressible divine transcendence.

How is transubstantiation to be understood if the word "substance" no longer has any meaning? We are urged to abandon this confined notion, be-

cause through its use a grossly realistic metaphysics has replaced speculation that should have remained "religious." Instead of some unintelligible physical presence, let us think of the consecrated species as the efficacious sign of an invisible, spiritual presence—a sign that assures the union, the communion, in Christ of all members of the Mystical Body.

Opposition between life and structure, a favorite modern notion, is the basis for some people distinguishing the Mystical Body from the Roman Catholic Church. "Mystical Body" means for them the union of all who are saved through grace and charity; while the Church is the organized society that employs all the restraints of "legalism." They maintain that one can belong to the Mystical Body without being a member of the Church. Pope Pius XII, however, makes it perfectly clear that the teaching which he proposed in the "Mystici Corporis" is no longer the object of free theological discussion: the Mystical Body of Christ and the Church are one and the same. The "faithful outside the fold" who, without benefit of Catholic preaching and the Sacraments, have according to God's designs received grace and faith and charity belong as much to the Church as they do to the Mystical Body. They belong invisibly to the visible Church.

### What of evolution?

On the problem of evolution as it concerns the Catholic faith the teaching of the Encyclical is very clear and carefully worded. Can one consider man as the result of an animal evolution? It may be that in some domains of life evolution has been established clearly enough to be considered a scientific fact. But to propose evolution as a general explanation that is valid for all living things, to say that all the manifold structural differences of living things proceed from some first principle that is itself completely undifferentiated—this is nothing more than hypothesis. It is extremely important in this matter that we do not overemphasize scientific data and give the impression that they are all of equal value and absolutely certain. We must also be careful that we do not minimize what theology tells us is taught by Revelation or is connected with Revelation. In both science and theology there are some truths that are certain and some data that are less certain; both must be carefully weighed.

There can be no doubt that the soul of man can only come from God by immediate creation. Did the Creator, in the formation of the body of the first man, make use of matter that was already living or of inanimate matter? The Church leaves to Catholic thinkers liberty to debate this question prudently, provided that they are determined to accept her teaching when she does make a definite decision.

### The Church is unique

In closing, we would like to express the feeling of tremendous confidence in the Catholic Church that one receives from reading such a document. At a time when the threatening menace of war and the assault of atheism and irreligion seem to demand that the conditions for a common front of resistance be reduced to a minimum, the Church's stand against a formidable current of thought is humanly inexplicable. The Church knows, however, that she cannot take the easy path of compromise. It is not only the past that the Church is protecting, but it is also the future that she is preserving.

The Church is most profoundly singular in this: she believes in truth. Our so-called modern world, which actually seems to be a declining era, has despaired of truth. The new age which is being born will certainly not be a resurrection of the past. With the strength of youth, which comes to her from the possession of immutable truth, the Church goes forth to meet this new era. The Church does not need to be reconciled with the world; she does not have to be converted; it is she who converts the world. It is she who truly lives.

# The Encyclical Humani Generis And Theology

F. Taymans, S.J.

We shall limit ourselves in this present study to those parts of the Encyclical that concern theology and its methods. If questions concerning other disciplines are brought in, it will be only in passing and to the extent that they have a bearing on theology.

Although the Encyclical condemns a number of errors, its chief purpose seems to be to stigmatize a certain attitude toward theology: namely, that the theology and theological methods which are used in our schools today with the approbation of ecclesiastical authority need not merely to be perfected, but need to be completely reformed if the reign of Christ is to be spread throughout the whole world among men of every culture and religious opinion.

In condemning this attitude, the Holy Father does not wish to deny the necessity of progress and adaptation; in fact, if it were merely a question of adapting ecclesiastical teaching to present needs, there would be little cause for worry. In this study we shall consider the characteristics, the causes, and the effects of this skeptical attitude toward theology.

Let us remark, first of all, that although this skepticism is directed primarily at systematic theology, it has its influence on positive theology also. For example, it would confine positive theology to the study of the various ways in which the revealed truth has been expressed in the different doctrines and systems that have flourished in the course of the centuries. Positive theology would thus be reduced to the rank of a purely historical science.

It is principally in its attitude to systematic theology that this skepticism shows its dominant traits. Chief among them is a kind of dogmatic relativism, which finds expression in statements like the following: "The mysteries of faith cannot be expressed in terms which are true, but only in approximations to the truth which are always changeable; they indicate the truth to a certain extent, but also necessarily deform it." In condemning this dogmatic relativism, the Holy Father does not wish to deny the intrinsic limitations of human knowledge; hence it would be false to see in this condemnation an approval of a certain philosophical and theological rationalism. On the contrary, the Encyclical gives new approval to the traditional scholastic position on knowledge.

There are two kinds of knowledge: abstractive, which terminates at the generic and specific characteristics of the object; intuitive, which terminates at the concrete and individual reality. Abstractive knowledge is true knowledge, but as it never grasps the object in the fullness of its concrete reality, it can always be perfected. Along the path that stretches between imperfect abstractive knowledge of reality and perfect intuitive grasp there is always room for progress.

If this position is abandoned, we will again be faced with the dilemma of choosing between Cartesianism, in which the real is always present according to the totality of its determinations in every clear idea, and agnosticism. To say, then, that the mysteries

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of faith can be expressed only by approximations is absurd. Progress in the understanding of dogmas does not come about by the substitution of new ideas for old ones, but by deeper appreciation of ideas already acquired.

If the Holy Father insists on the point that knowledge once acquired remains acquired, he in no way denies the incomplete and imperfect character of human knowledge. But affirmations that have been established by Catholic Doctors under the guidance of the Church and with the help of the Holy Spirit participate to some extent in the absolute character of divine truth. And the progress of theological tradition consists not in rejecting what former generations have acquired, but in plumbing the depths of the truths already present and discovering in them other truths.

**Dangers and errors**

Behind these errors are doctrines which have already been condemned. Some do not hesitate to show themselves favorable to a monistic and pantheistic hypothesis of a universe that is perpetually evolving. This is not a condemnation of transformism. What is condemned is that absolute evolution which denies creation and pretends to explain the origin and development of the universe and all that it contains, even the moral and spiritual life of man, by the principle of evolution.

Closely connected with evolutionism is the doctrine of immanentism which must be kept distinct from the method of immanence. The latter, based on the principle of St. Thomas "Nihil potest ordinari in aliquem finem nisi praeexistat in ipso quaedam proportio ad finem," tries to show man's need for the supernatural in the present order where he is actually ordered to a supernatural end. Immanentism as a doctrine is quite another thing, for it views the supernatural as a mere extension and exaltation of the natural.

The Encyclical also speaks of a new error, existentialism, both that which is professedly atheistic and that which simply rejects metaphysical reasoning and anything absolute, certain, or necessary. This rejection of ultimates lies at the root of a strange mental paralysis that characterizes existentialism: completely self-confident when dealing with facts of experience, human reason suddenly loses all power of affirmation when confronted with metemperical reality.

Another error to which the Holy Father repeatedly refers is irenicism, the imprudent attempt to remove the barriers between men by trying to reconcile contradictory doctrines in the field of dogma. The importance of this point is obvious to any apologist or apostle, for in modern times the Church has continually advised its teachers to adapt the message of salvation to the mental background and outlook of non-Christians. Realizing that in the midst of many errors the non-Christian mentality still retains some fragments of truth, the Church urges her apostle to utilize these bits of truth as bridges to lead men's minds to the full truth.

The past thirty years give abundant proof that there is real danger in this sympathetic and intelligent approach to the presentation of Catholic truth. Deference for the truth which non-Christians do possess and respect for their sincerity and good will can degenerate into an ingenuous admiration for everything that is said and done outside the Church. This in turn leads to that false notion that the Church must renew its vigor and sanctity by adopting certain new doctrines from non-Christian sources. Such a view misunderstands the law that governs the growth of the Church, and forgets that in Christ the Church possesses the source of all truth and sanctity.

The principal effect of this skeptical attitude is a lack of regard for the teaching authority of the Church, which is represented as a hindrance to progress and an obstacle to science. It is not surprising that this attitude has led to errors in every branch of theology.

In dogmatic theology, several errors concerning God and man's knowledge of God are again being taught, despite the fact that they have already been condemned. Against these the Pope simply reaffirms the Catholic position: human reason can attain true knowledge of God; revelation is morally necessary; the human mind can obtain some knowledge of mysteries; God has eter-

nal and infallible foreknowledge of man's free acts.

Some call into question the probative value of the criteria of revelation. In condemning this error, the Holy Father seems to settle some points that up to the present have been argued by theologians, for he says that rational evidence suffices for the unaided human reason to know with certainty the divine origin of the Christian religion. The Pope is not, of course, speaking of the assent of faith, which requires the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in order to be made "sicut oportet ad salutem"; but he does seem to say that the human intellect has the physical capacity to see the probative validity of the criteria of revelation.

We say the "physical capacity" because the Holy Father does not deny that there might be a moral necessity of divine help in making a certain judgment of credibility in the real order. He supposes divine help which, after having moved a man interiorly to search for the signs of revelation, gives that rectitude of will that is indispensable for a true judgment. A judgment made with such divine help loses none of its rationality, and faith is not required to make it certain.

With respect to creation, some deny that the world had a beginning, while others say that creation was morally necessary since God was constrained by His love and generosity to create. This latter error is based on another more profound one, namely, that God would be egoistic if He did not love something besides Himself. As if things are not more lovable in God than they are in themselves! As if God became more generous by creation than He was before!

### Creation and elevation

Closely related to the problem of creation is that of the origin of man. The teaching of the Encyclical on this point can be summed up thus: 1. the Church does not condemn as erroneous the doctrine of evolution as applied to the body of man; 2. research in regard to evolution is not forbidden; 3. the doctrine of transformism is not yet certain and should not be taught as such; 4. reserve and prudence should be used in these matters.

Some deny the gratuity of man's elevation to the supernatural, for they maintain that God could not create intelligent beings without ordering them to the Beatific Vision. Although all theologians admit that intelligent beings necessarily have a radical capacity for being raised to the supernatural order, it was not necessary that man actually be raised. Whatever may have been the position of Doctors of the Church on the question of the natural desire for the Beatific Vision, they all held that such a natural desire would be inefficacious.

On the problem of man's lapse from this elevated state, some moderns question the personal and individual character of the sin of Adam and the universality of original sin.

The Holy Father also touches briefly on other errors, particularly those regarding the satisfaction of Christ, the real presence in the Eucharist, and the Mystical Body. He refers to the teaching of "Mystici Corporis" which some have regarded as not binding in conscience, and he restates the teaching that the Roman Catholic Church and the Mystical Body are one and the same. It is impossible to be a member of the Mystical Body without being bound to the visible Church by a bond which is real though at times invisible.

Some may ask if the Encyclical puts certain limits on theology, especially in the field where there has been most thought and discussion in the last thirty years. On the contrary, we believe that it gives greater freedom of conscience. The Holy Father does not want to hinder scientific studies; rather he exhorts us to even more diligent research. The letter is a paternal admonition characterized by good will and moderation. It does away with much equivocation and wipes out any impression which some people may have had that the Church was gradually retracting her condemnation of Modernism.

Probably the most important effect of the Encyclical will be a restoration of esteem for the patrimony of thought which traditional theology maintains and represents. It does away with the false notion that we must begin again, as if all that has been done so far were an obstacle. In denouncing this error the Holy Father is doing a service not only to theology, but also to reason; for he reaffirms the basic law of science that progress in thought depends on continuity—we must build upon what has been achieved, not destroy it.

# Decree Restoring the Ancient Observance of Easter Eve

A. Bugnini

By this decree Pope Pius XII has restored to the Church its second Holy Night—the "mother of all vigils" (St. Augustine), an observance of greater dignity than Christmas Eve in origin, importance, and solemnity.

In the course of time, the rite had been moved to the morning hours of Holy Saturday, and great harm was done to its mystical symbolism. Everyone is aware of the great value of symbolism in sacred rites, which are really a humanistic and religious school in which the Church teaches the faithful to rise from material to spiritual things and to the truths of faith. The rites of the Paschal Vigil effect this most happily, and this was one reason why they have been restored to their original splendor. Further incentive came from the historical knowledge of the early Church's liturgy that has been gained during the past fifty years, due largely to the publication of many early codices. A third motive was pastoral: when these beautiful and symbolic rites are enacted in the morning, they are poorly attended by the faithful. In earlier times, Holy Saturday—together with the rest of Holy Week—was a holy day of obligation, but during the pontificate of Urban VIII the custom was abolished.

By the return of Easter Eve solemnities to the night, Holy Saturday again becomes "aliturgical," i.e., without eucharistic celebration. Those who will celebrate the vigil on Holy Saturday night and who are also bound by the obligation of choir must advance Matins and Lauds to Holy Saturday morning: this gives the people an opportunity to be present and leaves Holy Saturday with at least some sacred functions. It has the added happy effect of eliminating the conflict of devotions on Good Friday evening.

The "Miserere," a psalm of sadness, and the prayer "Respice," both rather late additions to the Office, are removed as inconsonant with the quiet joy over the approaching victory of Christ that the vigil announces. A new oration is provided and the anomalous "pro vesperis" of the present rite is replaced by a Vespers in standard form. The present "pro vesperis" arrangement is not only a late addition, but would be incongruous at the new hour assigned for the Vigil Mass.

The hour which the Roman Missal calls "suitable" is more accurately determined as "one which would permit the Solemn Mass of the Paschal Vigil to begin about midnight." A review of early liturgical documents shows the

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**This commentary** was published, along with the decree **De Solemni Vigilia Paschali Instauranda** which it explains, in a special supplement to Fascicle 1, 1951, of the **Ephemerides Liturgicae.** The decree itself is a tentative one and applies to Easter, 1951, only. Unless extended, it has already expired; but everything leads one to suspect that the change will be made permanent. The commentary is important in its own right as a reflection of modern liturgical development. The fact that the Imprimatur given to the commentary is dated before the date of the decree itself indicates the close connection of those who drew up the commentary with those who drew up the proposed modifications of the Vigil rite. In its original form, the commentary includes detailed rubrical directions.

aptness of this time as well as the progressive development which led to the anomalies of the present rite.

The ceremony begins as usual with the blessing of the new fire, which may take place outside or inside the church, as long as the people can follow the ceremony. This provision illustrates the pastoral solicitude of the decree. By doing away with the blessing of the grains of incense, a blessing which had developed because of a misunderstanding of the word "incensum," a partial return is made to the original rite.

This return is emphasized by the addition of a proper blessing for the Paschal candle immediately after the blessing of the fire. This eliminates the need for the apparent blessing formerly performed by the insertion of the grains of incense during the "Exsultet." It emphasizes too the importance of the Paschal candle in the rites that are to follow.

**The blessing begins**

The first part of this blessing with its incision of a cross, Alpha, Omega, and the date is a return to a custom which preceded the seventh century and was common in the early middle ages. Carving the cross on the candle represents the blessing of the candle; the Alpha and Omega and date indicate the position of Christ (who is symbolized by the Paschal Candle) as the King and Lord of the ages. All this is beautifully expressed by the accompanying prayer. During the second part of the blessing, the grains of incense are inserted and an appropriate prayer taken from the present rite for the blessing of the fire is used. The original form of the prayer is restored since it again exercises its original function.

The solemn procession now forms around the Paschal Candle, lighted during the blessing and carried by the deacon, and proceeds into the darkened church. The central function of the Candle and the needs of the following ceremony cause an inversion of the usual processional order. The "Lumen Christi" is sung as usual, but all genuflect to the Candle. At the first pause the celebrant's candle is lighted from the Paschal Candle, at the second, the candles of the clergy, and at the third, the lamps in the church and the candles of the people. The Paschal Candle is the image of Christ triumphant over the darkness of death and for this reason is accompanied in solemn procession, while the lighting of all the candles signifies the illumination of the world through Baptism.

The deacon places the Candle in the center of the sanctuary and while all the others, including the celebrant, are seated in their places, sings the "Exsultet" without interruption. The complete text of St. Ambrose's hymn is used. A prayer for civil rulers is substituted for the prayer for the Roman emperor which is regularly omitted in the present rite. Thus has the true "laus cerei" of the ancients regained its place and the gradual transformation of the hymn into a "benedictio cerei" been eliminated.

**The prophecies chanted**

After the usual preparations, the chanting of the prophecies now takes place, but with several important changes. First of all, while the lectors read the prophecies, the celebrant remains seated. He exercises his liturgical function by occupying his proper hierarchical position and not by reading the prophecies himself. This marks a return to the ancient practice and is an equally valid liturgical method. Secondly, a definite pause for prayer is made between the "Flectamus genua" and "Levate," which introduce the orations. Such a pause is not only more suitable but is a return to the ancient custom. Thirdly, the number of prophecies is reduced to those four (Lessons 1, 4, 8, and 11 of the present twelve) which have an accompanying tract. Though one of the deciding motives for the change was the desire to lighten the burden of the long lessons, there is also some historical evidence for the use of this number at certain periods. The original spirit of instruction of catechumens is kept.

After the prophecies the cantors begin the litany of the Saints and continue to "Propitius esto," but without duplicating the invocations. The litanies were once intended to fill the gap for those in the church while baptisms were being performed in a distant baptistry, and this purpose was the reason for the duplication. The new arrangement is based on a medieval precedent.

At the "Propitius esto," the celebrant proceeds to bless the baptismal water in full view of the congregation and without going to the font. Another example of the pastoral solicitude characterizing the changes! An even greater example of the same interest is the introduction of a new rite in which all those in the congregation renew their baptismal vows at this stage of the ceremonies. It is a concrete renewal of the central role that baptismal ceremonies played in the original form of the vigil ceremony. The form of the rite recalls the ritual order of the administration of Baptism, and the use of the vernacular is permitted in those regions which are allowed to use it in the regular administration of the Sacrament—another sign of the desire of the Church to help the faithful to gain the full fruits of the sacred liturgy.

**Preparations for Mass**

While the litany of the Saints is being completed, the preparations are made for Mass; the prostrations of the present rite are omitted. These prostrations were a relic of the ordinations which took place at this time. The custom of ordaining on Holy Saturday, however, seems to have come into general use only about the twelfth century, and to have been rare in the early centuries. The introduction of the prostrations into the general rite, even where no ordinations took place, was a merely mechanical transposition and is properly abrogated in the new rite.

After the completion of the litany, the Mass begins and proceeds as in the Missal with these exceptions: the prayers at the foot of the altar and the last Gospel are omitted, the "Vespere autem Sabbati" becomes a regular Communion antiphon, and the "Magnigicat" is not sung. The omission of the prayers at the foot of the altar and of the last Gospel is a return to the practice of the early Church, since these are innovations of the late Middle Ages. Even though the text of the Vulgate does not express the true sense of the original, the "Vespere autem Sabbati" is retained in its present form because it seemed opportune to wait for a general revision of such texts. Besides, it was set to music, and alterations were avoided in those sections which were set to music.

**Principles listed**

From the examination of the rite, we can state the principles involved in the restoration of the "most holy night" to its original dignity.

1. The heritage of tradition was cherished and kept as long as it was consonant with the ceremony as a whole, and did not detract from the true and original significance.

2. Where it was useful for a better understanding of the meaning which inspires the liturgy of the vigil and where necessary as a result of the restoration to a nocturnal position, the primordial rites were restored to their original form.

3. New elements were introduced where needed to keep the form of the liturgy a living thing. Just as the Church is resplendent in her modernity as well as in her antiquity, so the liturgy, as a vital expression of religious vigor, cannot be something like a stone or an archaeological exhibit, but must live and make progress. As the encyclical "Mediator Dei" solemnly teaches, the Holy Spirit did not only direct the Church in inaugurating liturgical rites in the early days; He guides her now. Finally, antiquity is not the sole rule for the preservation of sacred rites. Pastoral liturgy has the salutary task of leading the faithful to the font of true Christian spirit through sacred rites adapted to the necessities of life. It has always had as its aim the active participation of the people in these rites.

# The Formula: Cujus Regio, Ejus Religio

J. Lecler, S.J.

**It is commonly said** that the Peace of Augsburg, in 1555, founded the state church in Germany on the principle: **Cujus regio, ejus religio.** Actually, the peace involved only the Catholic and Lutheran princes and formulated a non-general principle; it merely tried to settle the religious wars. Ferdinand, at the request of his father, Charles V, negotiated the peace and strongly influenced certain portions of it. The treaty itself was a new triumph in Germany for the particularist forces.

The princes gave each other liberty of conscience within the bounds of their two faiths. No sovereign could be forced to change his religion; nor could he be prevented from doing so if he wished, although the peace imposed penalties on the passage of a Catholic prince to Lutheranism. This last restriction was always considered as null by the Protestant princes.

Theoretically, subjects had freedom of conscience within the bounds of the two religions. They might have to emigrate to another state, but they were to suffer no loss on that account. In case of disputes between subject and prince in religious matters, no outside sovereign was to interfere.

One can see that this treaty was only a concrete attempt to produce a religious peace. No such formula as **cujus regio** appeared until the end of the 16th century. The first writer to use it, Joachim Stephani (1577-1623), a Lutheran canonist, saw in the treaty of Passau—a provisory standard which Augsburg simply confirmed—the transference of episcopal rights to the princes. His argument was that **religio** was identical with **jus episcopale seu jurisdictio spiritualis.**

This maxim represents a systemization that certainly was non-existent at the Peace of Augsburg. The practical order preceded the organization of a theory.

The development of the state churches in Germany can be summarized briefly. Even before the Reformation, the German princes had acquired many spiritual rights by concession of the Church. Protestantism aggravated the situation. The Lutherans, being forced to seek aid from the secular powers, had to yield to state influence in ecclesiastical affairs. The Protestant princes were not slow to accumulate both political and spiritual power, once they were freed from the authority of Rome and the emperor. To a lesser degree, the same was true of the Catholic princes. They too could appeal to the part they were playing in Church affairs. This situation was put on a legal basis by the Peace of Augsburg. The next step was to systematize into a formula the concrete achievement of Augsburg.

**Cujus regio** is not in the spirit of the first Reformers. Luther, Melancthon, and their immediate successors viewed the prince as an important person in religion, but his part was to come as a duty, not as a right. The prince was to guard and protect religion; he was not to exercise jurisdiction in spiritual matters. Actually, the first Reformers, in their efforts to obtain the states' support for the Reformation, placed civil power and religious functions on the same plane. Luther himself came close

the formula we are studying. In a letter to the Elector of Saxony in 1525, he said that princes, in the interest of public order and peace, should prevent the preaching of rival religions. His lesson was not lost, for the Elector wrote an Instruction in 1527, prohibiting any opposing sects in his domain.

### The danger grows

A more dangerous opinion appeared in 1555. Jean Brenz wrote that a sovereign had the power of judging and deciding about religious doctrine. Certainly this is equivalent to the jus reformandi which was to be clearly expressed in the Peace of Westphalia. In fact, in 1541, during the Conference of Ratisbon, the Protestant princes had demanded that each sovereign have the right of choosing his own faith and imposing it on his subjects. This proposal was rejected, but it shows how the Protestant princes had been encouraged by the Reformers to extend the exercise of their jurisdiction.

Just before the Peace of Augsburg, the Catholic princes published a declaration that at first sight seems very close to the cujus regio: "Every prince has the right to support and protect the ancient religion in his lands . . . ubi unus dominus, ibi una sit religio." In reality, they were merely enunciating the mediaeval formula: one faith, one law, one king. They were proclaiming themselves protectors of the traditional religion.

A far different interpretation of Augsburg is found in the writings of Joachim Stephani, who is one of the first representatives of the "episcopalist" system. In his theory, cujus regio gives to the prince of a territory the ancient episcopal rights. This is a long step from the views both of the first Reformers and traditional Catholicism. "Episcopalism" was maintained by another Lutheran canonist, Matthias Stephani, who wrote in 1611 that the prince had at one and the same time jus territorii et jus episcopale.

Later jurists were even more daring. Some taught that the sovereignty of the prince in religious matters was but one aspect of his general sovereignty. There was no transference of these episcopal rights because of the Reformation, but a recovery of what had always been the just due of the prince. A. Rechenberg (1695) well expressed this doctrine of territorialism when he said that "rulers have the right of imposing any religion on their citizens and can exercise and regulate sacred affairs at will." It is in this sense that one can say that cujus regio is a reincarnation of the pagan concept of the state.

This Protestant theory seems to have evolved chiefly because of a preoccupation with the problem of jurisdiction. To the Protestant jurists, a double jurisdiction seemed to be a two-headed monster. Their solution was to place both civil and religious jurisdiction in the hands of the civil power. Thus in 1560, Wolfgang Musculus, a disciple of Zwingli, maintained that the Church had no autonomous authority and was completely subject to the unique power of the state. Thomas Eraste, in 1558, used the same thesis to solve the problem of excommunication. He gave to the prince the power of excommunication as a punitive measure, and his argument was again the need for unicity of jurisdiction.

### The unchangeable king

Eraste was concerned with but a single aspect of a much larger problem, that of sovereignty. However, an important work, the Republique of Jean Bodin appeared in 1576. He envisaged sovereignty as being essentially immutable, absolute, and indivisible. His work was hailed in France by the Gallicans, and the Protestant countries also made good use of it in fortifying the power of the state in religious matters. We have only to look at the influence Bodin had on Grotius (1583-1645).

Grotius held that the territorial sovereignty of the state is universal and indivisible and that it has an equal relation to ecclesiastical and civil organization. He illustrated this theory with the example of physicians and pastors, each of which works in a different sphere. Neither needs the state for his knowledge or skill, but they can exercise their "art" only under the

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This article is taken from the first issue of the Recherches de Science Religieuse for [illegible]. Father Lecler is a professor at the Institut Catholique of Paris, and most of his writings have been on topics connected with the relation of Church and State. His articles have appeared in the Recherches and in Etudes, of which he is an editor.

authority and control of civil power. Grotius does not appeal to the **cujus regio**, but his work is impregnated by its spirit.

Territorialism and Erastianism aptly characterize Grotius' system. The religious power of the state is founded on territorial sovereignty; this is the logical conclusion of the premises Eraste employed in the solution of a more minute problem. Grotius, of course, had carried the theory to much wider applications.

#### Territorialism grows

Territorialism as a system was established in Germany during the 17th century. By 1619, the Lutheran jurist Reinkingk could declare that the **jus reformandi** was a normal attribute of temporal sovereignty: an attribute stemming in truth from Augsburg but nonetheless a restitution, not an innovation. Another jurist, Benoit Carpzov, in 1649, appealed both to Reinkingk and to earlier writings as authorities on the rule **cujus regio.** He also bears witness to its general acceptance by the princes and by some Catholic theologians.

One cannot deny that, by the middle of the 17th century, the principle **cujus regio** was spread throughout the Empire and used by both Protestants and Catholics. French Gallicanism naturally was profiting by its vogue. Catholics everywhere were influenced by the current theory of territorialism, and only prompt action by Rome saved the Catholic states from complete infection by the theory.

Grotius' territorialism was commonly taught towards the end of the 17th century by the German school of natural right. This group included Pufendorf, Thomasius, Ziegler, J. H. Boehmer, and Wolff. These jurists were interested mainly in using the theory to encourage tolerance. For them the **jus circa sacra** could be exercised to permit diversity of religion where that was to the interest of the state. According to the times, diversity might be preferable to unity of religious beliefs. Such a view had already been suggested by Grotius in 1616, and the German school of natural right merely emphasized his conclusion.

Pufendorf, for instance, writing in 1687, recommended that the prince close his eyes to certain religious dissidents when they were not troublesome to state interests. He did not reject as false the **cujus regio** because of his territorialistic leanings, but he deplored its abuses. As far as the Catholics were concerned, he could not see how they could agree with the meaning of the maxim and yet could deny the **jus circa sacra.**

Boehmer, some years later, in 1714, further limited the use of **cujus regio.** He would not restrain subjects to follow a sovereign in the event he changed his religion; to do so would be to invite civil disturbances. At most the **jus reformandi** would permit a prince to interfere in or change the practise of religion under the conditions that: 1. he would reform only exterior discipline, **salva libertate conscientiae;** 2. this reform be dictated by the good of the state.

#### Dangers of the theory

Thus territorialism finds itself tempered by the liberalism of later political thinkers. It guards freedom of conscience on the grounds of the ultimate good of the state. In the history of religious tolerance, this position is of real importance.

But is it a solid basis for the guarantee of religious freedom? Territorialism, even in its liberal form, denies the Church that autonomy which is necessary to her work and it continues to subordinate the spiritual order to the sole interests of the State. Diversity of religion is permitted only for the momentary advantage of the State. But the interests of the State are always changing. At any time these interests may demand that the State exercise a strict regime over the Church, by reason of its high authority over spiritual matters. As an expression of territorialism, **cujus regio, ejus religio** remains a menace for religious liberty. It continues to exalt that pagan and totalitarian power from which Christ, through his Church, would free us.

# "Faith" in the Prophet Isaias

S. Virgulin

**This study proposes** to determine the concept, aspects, and import of "faith" according to the mentality of the Prophet Isaias. The word "faith" has a larger and more pregnant significance in Isaias than does the scholastic term. Though this prince of the prophets is, with Paul, the greatest figure of faith in human history, neither Catholic nor non-Catholic scholars have given exhaustive treatment to his faith, the summary expression of the total relation between God and man.

The characteristic term for faith both in our author and in the Old Testament derives from the root **'AMAN**, the original meaning of which was security, stability, certitude. The form **HEeMIN**, which occurs four times in Isaias, is frequently replaced by words meaning hope and confidence which more aptly express the fiducial character of faith.

During moments of great national and historical crises, like the Syrio-Ephraimitic War during the rule of Achaz, the anti-Assyrian alliance under Ezechias, and the invasion of Sennacherib, Isaias proposes faith in Yahweh as the rule of external policy and internal security. "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." This faith of political policy, far-reaching and rich in consequences, implies, for example, the refusal of alliance with Assyria and Egypt, the cessation of diplomatic machinations, the abandoning of military preparations such as Achaz pursued in defense of Jerusalem. It excludes confidence in one's own power or worldly wisdom, and demands recognition of the faults of human government.

Because of the messianic plan announced by the prophet, Yahweh is pledged to protect the land of Juda, where this plan will be effected. But it is necessary to believe with unshakeable conviction that Yahweh's message is true, that Juda is the land bound to superior designs, that Yahweh alone will save the state from all danger, whoever the enemy and whatever his power.

Through this faith man commits himself unconditionally to Yahweh's will, His way of governing the world and each private life. By it man becomes prompt to undergo any sacrifice to satisfy the religious, political, moral, or social demands of the Lord. Thus Achaz, had he accepted the prophet's word (7:9), would have relied solely on Yahweh for help and abolished the idolatrous worship in Jerusalem.

The personal relations between the believer and Yahweh is total and exclusive, insofar as it requires all the forces and energies of the community and of the individual for the service of Yahweh. Yahweh in turn is set in communication with the faithful in the fullness of His being as the only God, the ruler of the world, and the author of the messianic plan. When the individual and the state admit their own weakness and dependence on the Supreme Being, this in no way results in a quietistic

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**This digest** is taken from an article that appeared in the second and third issues of **Biblica** in 1950 under the title "La 'Fede' nel Profeta Isaia." The author, S. Virgulin, examines theocratic and Messianic faith in Isaias and describes the development and growth of the one into the other.

fatalism, but rather in unsuspected power, high spiritual activity, and ardent courage.

The practical results of this faith are found in chapters thirty-six and thirty-seven, in the marvelous liberation of Jerusalem from the Assyrian invader in 701 B.C. Isaias, the center of this drama, some years previously declared that God would not allow the city to perish. When Sennacherib has taken the entire surrounding country and besieged the capital, so that only the final catastrophe is awaited, Isaias repeats his former prediction to the delegates sent by Ezechias. Ezechias expresses his faith in the prophet's word by showing courage before the Assyrian legates, by having recourse to Yahweh in the temple, and by doing penance for his previous worldly policy. By this absolute faith in Yahweh, Isaias and Ezechias go down in history not only as great spiritual men but also as great patriots, saving Jerusalem and Juda from ruin.

### Faith as an attitude

Faith consists, therefore, not in an act of the intellect giving consent to a certain truth nor in a disposition of confidence; but rather in an attitude, a mode of being, fundamental, habitual, and constant in respect to Yahweh, embracing a knowledge of one's nothingness and of one's complete dependence on God—humility, acceptance of God's word, confidence, hope, patience, obedience, abnegation. Though it looks continually to the future, it is a basic position and a norm for the present and for every moment of existence. The difference between faith and incredulity spells the difference between salvation and catastrophe.

Two passages in Isaias—7:9 and 28:16—are particularly deserving of our attention. In preparation for the former text, Isaias has revealed to Achaz the conspiracy of the allied powers of Israel and Damascus to occupy the country and force Juda into an anti-Assyrian coalition, their principal purpose being to dethrone the king, substitute a foreigner, and thus break down the Davidic dynasty. Such a plot was directly opposed to Yahweh's plan for the House of David, to whom an eternal rule was promised. Though the descendants be contaminated by sin and deserving of punishment, God would not abolish this house, either in its religious aspect as relating to the Messiah or in its theocratic aspect relative to its temporal prosperity—on condition that the Law be faithfully observed.

Therefore, the immediate object of faith in this passage is the safety of the capital; the mediate object, messianic, the perpetuity of the Davidic dynasty.

To render this prediction credible, Yahweh makes known to Achaz a great sign: Emmanuel the Messiah, in whom Yahweh's promise will be realized, will be miraculously born of a virgin (7:14). This prophecy, in so far as it predicts something unforeseeable by the human mind and contains something entirely miraculous, serves as an excellent demonstration of the divine omnipotence and as an effective motive to strengthen belief in God the liberator. Moreover, the infant to be born is here and now a pledge and guaranty of salvation for the House of David. Hence, the person and the miraculous birth of Emmanuel become part of the material object of faith, since it is because of him that the House of David and the kingdom of Juda will not fall.

### Messiah: motive and object

It might be asked how the Messiah at one and the same time can be both the motive and the object of faith. The prophetic perspective relates present to future events, and future to present events, not chronologically but ideally and causally. No laws of logic are violated by this supratemporal presentation of divine revelation. Under different aspects, therefore, and performing diverse functions, at one and the same time the Messiah is the motive of faith by his extraordinary birth, and the object of faith by his presence and activity here and now.

In the second text, 28:16, there are two principal ideas: first, salvation comes from Yahweh and His work constructed on Sion, a precious and solid stone set as the base for a new temple; and second, in order to obtain this salvation, belief in the Messiah, symbolized by Sion, is necessary. The Messiah to come becomes [illegible] of salvation for Jerusalem and Juda because of the categorical and unconditional will of Yahweh.

What were the motives of credibility that rendered these prophecies acceptable to the individual and to the state? In the first place, Isaias had the requisite moral authority, called as he was to this prophetic ministry by a special vision. With sanctity of life, ardent zeal for the glory of Yahweh, and fiery preaching, he appeared as one sent to Juda from heaven. There were also miracles, such as the virgin birth proffered as proof to Achaz, and predictions that would prove true in the remote future or be fulfilled in the prophet's own lifetime.

This, then, is what is termed Isaias' "policy of faith" or "policy of sanctity," resulting in a state guided by religious principles so that diplomatic and military power is spurned and faith in God and the Messiah holds the central position in national and international history.

The charge that Isaias was an antipatriot in the service of a foreign power is sufficiently refuted by the fact that he twice saved his country from total disaster.

### The will of Yahweh

Those who defend Achaz's policy against Isaias' in 735 B.C. should remember that Juda was not one of the ordinary satellites of Asia, but a theocracy and, therefore, had divine principles and laws and not human ones. Isaias said it was not by Tiglathpileser that the city was liberated from the invading armies, but by the express will of Yahweh. On the other hand, it was because of Achaz's refusal to accept the "policy of faith" that the Assyrian intervenes in the affairs of Juda, bleeds it with tribute, and spreads idolatry.

Others claim Isaias' policy was not derived solely from religious motives, but from political ones as well, and thus is revealed his political acumen, his sense of reality, and his genius for foreseeing the future. Without denying any extraordinary natural genius, history has presented Isaias as a man of God and prophet rather than as a political figure. Such phrases as "Yahweh said to Isaias," and "Thus spoke the Lord God" indicate that the "policy of faith" came directly through inspiration and not from any natural talent.

Others admit the purely religious motive of Isaias' policy but call it Utopian. For them it is imprudent and impractical to refuse military means, to spurn alliances, to believe that God will change the destinies of man by a great miracle, or that conquerors will halt their advances if the people walk in the way of God. First, it must be noted that Isaias does not despise military measures in themselves. Yet, because Yahweh has forbidden them, confidence in them connotes despair in Yahweh's help. Sufficient motives are offered to follow this "policy of faith." Its effectiveness is shown by the destruction of Sennacherib under the walls of Jerusalem. Moreover, this policy of faith represents, in practice, the full tradition of the supernatural life of a theocratic people. To claim that this policy is Utopian is to attack the reality of the spiritual world with all of its essential religious truths.

### A special knowledge?

One attempt is made to save Isaias from the charge of Utopianism by insisting that the prophet had a personal, divine experience at a particular moment of history, enabling him in a mysterious way to see into the future and to evaluate a political situation. The ordinary Jews lacked this special knowledge. Hence, they could not be blamed for choosing other means, any more than Isaias could be blamed for proposing his own policy. However, the entire prophecy, filled as it is with threats of punishment if the proposed policy is not accepted, shows that the acceptance of any policy other than that of Isaias is gravely wrong.

Of great importance in Isaias is the vice which stands in strict opposition to faith, i.e., incredulity. Like its opposite, incredulity is a basic controlling outlook on the whole of life. It has a twofold aspect: negative, contempt for God; positive, the self-exaltation of man (**hybris**). This unbelieving pride can enter all phases of life. It infects the pagan peoples as well as the Jews.

Pride (**hybris**) is the insatiable desire of riches, the reliance on silver and gold, on fortifications and idolatrous practices, on confidence in foreign alliances. It is found in a more unbridled state in the pagan kingdoms, such as Assyria and Babylonia, in their blasphemies against Yahweh, in their self-security and arbitrariness in oppressing the nations, and in their usurpation of His divine prerogatives.

For Isaias this unbelieving pride is the capital sin of the world. It stands in sharp contrast to the glory of Yahweh. For any exaltation of self is a usurpation of something divine.

The consequence of this pride for both the Jews and the pagans is divine punishment. For example, the Jewish theocracy is punished by the total destruction of the temporal splendor of the Davidic dynasty. Pagan Babylonia is rendered uninhabitable, a refuge for beasts, her king is hurled unsepulchered into Sheol. Every kingdom that sets itself against Yahweh is destined to crumble.

The particular scope of the divine punishment, as frequently revealed by Isaias, is the complete humbling of human pride. The riches of Juda, the beauty of the daughters of Sion, the splendor of the Northern Kingdom—all created human glory must fade and disappear before the glory of Yahweh. So it will be in the "day of Yahweh," described with poetic grandeur by the prophet in his youth. The pride of man will be brought low and Yahweh alone will be exalted.

**Pride the dissolver**

In this light unbelieving pride appears as the principle of dissolution for all human grandeur. It is the reason for the general destruction, the justifying motive of the divine judgment.

The "policy of faith" heralded by Isaias did not fully succeed. In consequence of the incredulity of Achaz and his people, the temporal power and splendor of the kingdom of David, which were conditionally promised, would crumble. But the principal part, the religious part, of the divine plan would still be realized. In the new economy the focal point would no longer be the Messiah as savior of the theocracy, but the poor Emmanuel, who brings messianic salvation. Faith, therefore, does not suffer shipwreck with the theocracy, but becomes now exclusively spiritual and religious.

During the Syrio-Ephraimitic War, not all of the people followed Achaz, a few remained faithful to Yahweh and awaited their salvation, strengthened by the prophet's promise that Jerusalem would be saved.

When the theocracy, the temple and the holy city disappear and the Jews are in exile in Babylonia, they will be drawn not only to the culture but also to the religion of their conquerors. They will reexamine the teachings concerning the existence and nature of Yahweh; His relation with them, with the pagans, and with the world; and above all His fidelity in keeping His promises. In such great dangers, the prophet proposes as the way of salvation monotheistic faith, the acceptance of the Servant of Yahweh, and firm trust in God.

The essence of purely messianic faith is the same as that of theocratic faith as regards its substance, its all-embracing character in relation to Yahweh, and its basic function in the life of piety. The external reality is sad and obscure. During the times of Achaz and Ezechias, the majority of the people were already seen as destined for perdition, the result of Yahweh's punishment. In Isaias II (chapters 40-66) the situation is that of the exile with the hardships that it implies.

In the blackest hours of the exile, the believer turns his face toward God and His infallible promises, placing at the center of his life Yahweh and His salvific plan. He is persuaded even that there is no other way than the present exile that leads to the messianic kingdom. This patient, devout, heroic submission to Yahweh even when he does not fully understand is the best manifestation of the messianic attitude. This is what the word HEeMIN means in its purely religious, not theocratic aspect. That is why the prophet prefers to substitute for it words which by themselves convey the idea of habitual and lasting hope.

**Heemin considered**

This word HEeMIN as it occurs in Isaias II merits special consideration. While in Isaias I it has an important function as regards both content and context, in Isaias II it appears weaker, since it loses its historical-worldly force and retains only its intellectual-religious meaning. In chapters forty to forty-five it is used with a preposition to introduce the person to whose testimony one gives intellectual consent; and the object of faith in many of these passages is the famous monotheistic

formula "I am" by which God's immutability, eternity and unicity are contrasted with the number and names of the idols. After seeing the fulfillment of the ancient prophecies and the proposal of new ones, the exiles should come to a profound knowledge of the nature of God, a knowledge to be strengthened and deepened in their moments of trial and spiritual darkness.

Another important text is to be found in chapter fifty-three, the first verse of the famous fourth poem of "The Servant of Yahweh." The "Who hath believed our report?" must be taken to mean placing faith in a divine oracle, accepting as true that which is proposed by Yahweh. The object, construction, and parallelism of the passage all show the character of faith as an assent to truth, the first step towards the reception of the benefits of the redemption worked out by the Savior.

Thus **HEeMIN** in Isaias II does not indicate the completeness of the relation between God and man, but only the adherence to the truth that Yahweh is the only true God and that His humble and patient Servant is the cause of salvation.

#### Meaning diminished

The gradual diminution in the meaning of **HEeMIN** is suggested by the changed political situation. In Isaias I, where its meaning is expressly theocratic, the destinies of Yahweh's religion, of the Israelitic nation, and of the divine plan were considered as one, and faith had a double aspect, national and spiritual. But from the very beginning a division was effected. The majority of the people had chosen the way of human expediency, with just a few retaining the messianic faith. The prophet uses terms signifying hope to describe the attitude of these latter, since **HEeMIN** might be equivocal. In Isaias II, after the disappearance of the Jewish state, the problem of the exiles became entirely religious and so the theocratic **HEeMIN** no longer has place. The word, however, receives a new use when the Jews in Babylonia run the risk of losing their faith in the very existence of Yahweh. It comes to mean acceptance of the divine unicity of Yahweh and of His suffering and glorious Servant.

The material object of purely spiritual faith in Isaias I is not only the historical liberation from the enemies of Juda, but also, and primarily, the religious liberation worked by the Messiah of which the first liberation serves as symbol and pledge. The person of Emmanuel becomes part of the object the same way as was observed in theocratic faith.

In Isaias II the message of consolation and hope which the prophet brings to the exiles becomes the object of faith; and this message includes the liberation and restoration, the return of the Jews not only from the river Euphrates but also from all corners of the globe, peace and prosperity under God's protection.

Moreover, the prophet predicted another liberation, a spiritual one, whose author is the Servant of Yahweh. By means of suffering accepted willingly as expiation for the sins of men, the Messiah would redeem not only Israel but also the whole world from the dominion of sin and the devil. Thus a new Jerusalem would be formed from all nations. Isaias also had before his eyes the eschatological phase of the reign of God. The liberation from captivity and the reconstruction of Sion correspond to the decisive victory over paganism by which God's dominion is definitely established on earth.

#### Liberations connected

Though distinct from one another, these two liberations, one temporal and the other spiritual, are intimately connected from both the historical and figurative point of view, since the first is a figure, a preliminary condition, and principle of the second. Though topographical and Jewish concepts are used to describe them, they have a profound and universal meaning which embraces the supernatural world of the kingdom of God.

Given this typical and causal connection between the liberation of Jerusalem and of the exiles with the messianic liberation, the messianic reign becomes logically the primary object of faith. Since the new kingdom is the work of the Messiah, in the ultimate analysis the material object is fundamentally the Messiah and thus purely religious faith assumes a character essentially and exclusively messianic in Isaias II.

The formal object of faith is Yahweh who is the guarantee and fulfillment of His promises. For this reason, in Isaias

II the prophet emphasizes the unicity, creative power, dominion, providence, and love of Yahweh.

The motives of credibility in Isaias I are the same as those cited for the faith of theocracy. In Isaias II, the fulfillment of ancient prophecies is much stressed. Even the preciseness of the predictions of future things argues for their realization, e.g., the mission of Cyrus, the fall of Babylonia, the double liberation, and the prosperity of Jerusalem.

The disposition of the believer during the time of punishment is one of psychological stability, based on the certitude that the present trial will have a happy issue. During the exile this attitude assumes particular importance, since the Jews were then a prey to doubts and discouragement, had lost their ability to evaluate events properly, and had forgotten their own mission in history. In the midst of fatigue, skepticism, and delusion, hope represents a vital energy and marvelous power which gives the believer eternal youth and inexhaustible strength. The Servant of Yahweh is presented to them as an example of confidence. Patient, obedient, even in his sufferings and humiliations he possesses unshakeable confidence that His enemies will be destroyed.

#### Survival of the faithful

In the midst of all divine punishments the faithful survive and will participate in the new kingdom of God after the captivity. Thus faith frees man from the disastrous consequences of divine punishment, guaranteeing him security in every moment of history.

But the greatest effect of this faith is the salvation acquired in the messianic kingdom founded by Emmanuel, the Servant of Yahweh, and described at such great length in Isaias I and Isaias II.

This purely religious faith appears also as a powerful force in the world, a force that resists all calamities, overcomes kingdoms and powers by its repeated victories. It shares in the providence which the kingdom of the Messiah itself enjoys in the course of history.

Finally, purely messianic faith also has relation to the glory of Yahweh. While human pride is destined for ruin, the faithful through their confidence praise the majesty of Yahweh which is manifested in the double role of punishing the proud and saving the humble. Therefore, the final purpose of the redemption which is acquired by faith is the supreme glorification of the name of Yahweh, the ultimate end of the divine plan.

The faith-pride concept, so characteristic of Isaias' writings, directly derives from his idea of God. In his inaugural vision he contemplates Yahweh's sublime power, absolute sanctity, and universal glory. Yahweh wishes to embrace, to rule, and to fill up the world with His incomparable majesty. He makes His voice to be heard at the very ends of the earth; the wild beasts obey Him; mountains tremble at His appearance. He creates all things from nothing, tames the stormy sea, and changes the desert into a paradise. Nothing can withdraw itself from His government. Since His word is irrevocable and efficacious, though incomprehensible to the human mind, all obstacles to His plan of a spiritual empire founded on the Messiah must be removed.

#### Man and God

Before this holy and great God, man disappears in the dust, an impure, insufficient, and weak being, subject to corruption like all living things. The only proper attitude, then, towards God, is that taken by Isaias in the inaugural vision when he consecrated himself entirely to Yahweh's direction and offered himself unconditionally in His service. This is what the prophet directs for the state in his "policy of faith."

The prophet's message thus makes clear the gravity and culpability of any autonomous attitude of man or state. Incredulity and pride assume the proportions of the crime of lese majesty. The emphasis given the faith-pride concept is a natural corollary of the theological principles of the prophet. In Isaias this concept becomes universal, transcends the limits of the Jewish nation and the Old Testament, and becomes a fundamental principle of humanity and world history until the end of time.

# The Dogmatic Definition Of the Assumption

C. Freitoff, O.P.

The Assumption of the Blessed Virin Mary is not to be understood as if were a question of the glory of her oul alone, for this is common to all the ints. It is a question of that singular rivilege of the Mother of God accordng to which she was assumed into eaven not only in soul, but also, like er only-begotten Son, in body—therefore totally. Although there is no historical evidence of her having suffered eath, the Church's opinion seems to e that Mary did die. If she died, the rivilege of her Assumption includes an nticipated glorious resurrection.

Through the dogmatic definition of he bodily Assumption of the Mother f God the Church solemnly proposes he Assumption to the faithful as a ruth divinely revealed. Most naturally, hen, the question arises as to when God evealed this truth. Since divine revelation was definitely ended at the death f the last Apostle, whatever the Church t any time proposes to us as divinely evealed must certainly have been reealed before that event. The sources rom which the Church can draw these ruths are two. The first is Tradition, y which divine truths "received from he mouth of Christ Himself by the Apostles or given over, as it were, by hand from the Apostles themselves under the dictate of the Holy Ghost, have come down to us" (Denz. 783). The other source is Sacred Scripture, in which, under the inspiration of the same Holy Ghost, these truths handed on were, in part, written. If, then, the bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary is divinely revealed, it must be found in Tradition alone or both in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.

Experts are not in agreement as to whether or not there was, in the first centuries, mention of Our Lady's Assumption properly so-called. If there were no mention, that would be disastrous for those who judge it necessary to prove the Assumption historically. However, the bodily Assumption of Mary, considered as an historical fact, cannot be proved by witnesses. Without denying the historical character of her Assumption we must place the emphasis elsewhere. The point is not to attempt to certify the fact through evidence, but to adduce arguments which prove that the truth of this singular privilege has been revealed by God.

For proving this it is, of course, helpful to have the historical documents of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers showing that they believed in the Assumption. And most certainly there is such evidence after the first centuries. Nevertheless, from such evidence of antiquity one would not necessarily have

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The original of this digest was included the January, 1951, issue of **The Thomist**, evoted entirely to the Assumption. Cas-ar Friethoff, O.P., the author, is a profes-or of dogmatic theology in the University Amsterdam. In his article, after discussg the scope of the dogmatic definition of the Assumption, he considers the other privileges of Mary as to their probative value for showing that Mary was assumed bodily into heaven and, especially, for showing that this truth is implicitly revealed in Sacred Scripture.

an argument proving that the Assumption is an object of faith, for a statement which is true is not necessarily divinely revealed. That it is true has been clear for centuries because the universal Church has for centuries celebrated the bodily Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary with a special liturgical feast. In this, as in the canonization of saints, the Church cannot err. Yet through evidence of this kind the Assumption is not shown to be a revealed truth.

That the truth of the Blessed Virgin's Assumption be revealed by God, however, it is not necessary that it be found in so many words in the fonts of Revelation. One truth can be implicit in another and so be revealed with it and in it. For example, Sacred Scripture nowhere says in express words that Mary is the Mother of God, yet the Scriptures teach this truth because they teach both that Mary is the Mother of Jesus and that Jesus is a Divine Person. Similarly, the privilege of the Assumption has from ancient times been connected with one or another of those privileges which Revelation testifies were given to Mary. The Assumption seems to be demanded with more or less certainty because: (a) Mary is the Mother of God, (b) she is a virgin, (c) she is immaculate, (d) she is the cause of our salvation, and (e) she is blessed.

#### The exaltation

No one can be ignorant that the exaltation of the Blessed Virgin Mary to her supreme office, the divine maternity, was accomplished in a way demanded by the dignity of her vocation. For through this exaltation she entered into the intimate life of the Most Holy Trinity. Yet, although the divine maternity is the ultimate reason for the Assumption, as befitting the Mother of God, still from the mere knowledge of her divine maternity we do not seem to be able to attain certitude in regard to her Assumption. This is so because the necessary connection is hidden from us, since it depends entirely on the free will of God.

The following two arguments, from Mary's virginity and from the fact that she is immaculate, are much more forceful. As regards her virginity: It is a revealed truth that Mary remained a virgin even in giving birth to Christ. This virginity in childbirth of itself causes immunity from the sorrow included in the curse which God placed on the human race in the day of His wrath. "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" (Gen. 3:16). Just as the sin of man in Paradise is one, but has many aspects; so the curse is only one but has many aspects. Since Mary was therefore, by reason of her virginity in giving birth, immune from the pain of childbirth, we can legitimately reason: If one aspect of the curse is not present, then the whole curse is absent. If Mary is thus immune from the pain of childbirth, then she is also free from the return to dust. Mary therefore was assumed because she remained a virgin in childbirth.

#### From the immaculate conception

In like manner, from the fact that Mary is immaculate we can reason legitimately and conclude to the Assumption. Although the ecclesiastical definition considers only her conception in which she was immaculate, nevertheless, putting our confidence in divine tradition we should heed the declaration of the Church in the Council of Trent that Mary received the singular privilege whereby she avoided all sins, venial sins included. If this is certain, then it is also manifest that she was not weighed down with the penalty of returning to dust, for God punishes no one except on account of sin. Mary is assumed, then, because she is immaculate. This and the preceding argument from her virginity represent scientific reasoning processes by which the Assumption is rendered theologically certain.

There remain now two final reasons which are completely valid, just as they are in the question of Mary's Immaculate Conception. When in 1854 Pius IX defined the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, at the request of the bishops he indicated the sources in the deposit of Faith whence he drew the divine revelation of that privilege. In those same sources the Assumption is implicitly revealed, namely, in the revealed truths that Mary is in complete conformity with Christ in His victory over Satan and that she is blessed.

In the first place, Pius IX cited the famous text of the Proto-Evangel. "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed" (Gen. 3:15). He then explained that the Fathers and writers of the Church when quoting this text "taught that by this divine oracle the merciful Redeemer of the human race, the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, was clearly and openly pointed out beforehand, that His Most Blessed Mother, the Virgin Mary, was designated, and that at the same time the very enmity of both against the devil was signally expressed. Hence, just as Christ, the Mediator between God and man, assumed human nature, blotted out the handwriting of the decree that stood against us, and fastened it triumphantly to the Cross, so the Most Holy Virgin, united with Him and through Him, eternally at enmity with the poisonous Serpent, most completely triumphed over him, and thus crushed his head with her immaculate foot" (Ineffabilis Deus).

Therefore, as Christ's loving associate in His fullest triumph over Satan, Mary can never have been overcome by the devil in any way—neither by sin nor by any punishment, such as the return to dust, inflicted because of sin. Thus, in the revelation of this loving association of Mary with Jesus in our salvation, there is implied both that Mary was conceived immaculate and that she was assumed bodily into heaven. The truth of the Assumption was, then, revealed to us by God in His first declaration to men after the fall of Adam. Take away the Assumption, and the association with Jesus to which Mary was called becomes totally unintelligible and ceases to exist.

In defining the Immaculate Conception, Pius IX also cited the Gospel according to St. Luke wherein Mary is called blessed. (1:28: "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. Blessed art thou among women." And 1:42: "Blessed art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb.") He pointed out that these salutations of the Angel Gabriel and Elizabeth must be understood as implying the Immaculate Conception since this blessedness means that she was never subject to the curse. We must consequently include immunity from that part of the curse spoken in Genesis: "Thou shalt return to the earth out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return" (Gen. 3:19). Hence, in the revealed truth that Mary is blessed there is implicity revealed the truth that she was assumed into heaven without any return to dust.

Among the five arguments discussed above there are great differences in probative value. That Mary is the Mother of God merely shows a certain fittingness in the Assumption. That Mary is a virgin and that she is immaculate lead to a theological conclusion which makes us scientifically certain of the Assumption, just as we are made certain of it through the universal celebration of the liturgical feast of the Assumption. That Mary is associated with Christ in his fullest triumph and that she is blessed do not teach us primarily the certitude of the Assumption itself, but they do show that the bodily Assumption of the Mother of God has truly been revealed by God, and this revelation is a much greater thing.

It might be asked whether through such arguments too much, and hence nothing at all, is proved. For it does not seem clear why, in the cited texts of Sacred Scripture which the Supreme Pontiff has interpreted, the victory of the devil and the divine curse are restricted to decomposition alone and are not also extended to the separation of body and soul, that is, to death, properly so called. However, from the fact that Christ suffered and died to redeem us we know that immunity from every victory of the devil and from every divine malediction does not exclude death. Our Lord and Savior triumphed in a true and full sense over **sin**, which He as Lamb of God through His Passion and Death took from the world; and over **death**, which He overcame through His glorious resurrection; and finally, over Satan, whom He conquered by liberating us from sin and its punishment. The conformity of Mary with her Son demands precisely that she, like her only-begotten Son, should have undergone death on a day appointed by God, so that in the likeness of her Son, she might be granted the glorious

privilege of an anticipated resurrection. Just as her Son "was taken up from us into heaven," so she has been raised bodily above the skies to the heavenly kingdom.

Mary's Assumption crowns the work of salvation, since it shows that the salvific work of Christ is now absolute and perfect in at least one person—in her who alone obtained a greater grace than all others and whom, therefore, Christ's redemptive work regards more than it does all the rest of the elect taken together. She has indeed triumphed with Jesus over the ancient serpent, but she has effected this victory only through Him. Hence Jesus, the Savior of all men, is in the sublimest way imaginable the Savior of His Mother and His associate, the ever glorious Virgin Mary. The perfect salvation of Mary, assumed bodily into heaven, is one of the great glories of the Son of man.

Behold! She who stood by the cross of Jesus dying with Him, her heart pierced by a sword of sorrow, now stands as Queen at His right hand, so that again with Him and through Him she may lead the redeemed people to their goal.

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**Hundreds of articles** on the Assumption have appeared within the past two years. Selection of one of them for condensation meant that many other interesting and valuable works could not be included in this issue. One author's articles in particular seem to merit the notice of our readers.

Father I. Filograssi, S.J., of the Gregorian University contributed a lengthy study on the Assumption to the **Gregorianum,** the theological and philosophical journal of the University, in July, 1950. His article was motivated in part by a desire to answer the objections of the German Catholic historian, B. Altaner, against the possibility of a definition of the dogma of the Assumption. Father Filograssi laid stress on the truth that the Church is the proximate rule of faith. Hence, he argued, the almost unanimous request of the bishops for the definition (a request made in individual letters in reply to the Pope's asking for their opinions) indicated quite clearly the mind of the teaching Church.

In the following issue of the **Gregorianum,** which appeared after the definition of the dogma, Father Filograssi presented a careful study of the "Apostolic Constitution" defining the Assumption. Largely a textual analysis and commentary on the document, this article will prove of great help to anyone interested in making a more detailed study of the "Constitution."

This article concludes with several pages of brief notes calling the reader's attention to points of theological value which might be overlooked in a rapid reading of the "Constitution." These notes are summarized in the short condensation that follows below.

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A. The following points about the definition of the dogma of the Assumption may be worth noting.

1. The formula of definition is the same as that used by the Vatican Council in its definition of Papal Infallibility and, therefore, leaves no doubt about the defined nature of the dogma.

2. The definition does not state that Mary was assumed in virtue of her Immaculate Conception, perpetual virginity, and divine Motherhood. The definition states rather that Mary, who is ever Virgin and Immaculate Mother of God, was assumed.

3. The definition does not settle whether Mary died and was brought back to life. In the "Constitution" death is mentioned but only when the Pope cites the opinions of others. Unlike the Secret prayer of the former Mass of the Assumption, the new prayer contains no reference to death in connection with Our Lady. By far the larger number of theologians maintains that Mary did die, but some uphold the opposite view, and their number has increased in recent years.

4. Both Mary's body and soul were assumed, that is, the entire living person.

5. The definition sheds no new light on the nature of heavenly glory. In the "Constitution", however, some references are made to particular features of Our Lady's beatitude. Several points referring to Our Lady's glory are included in the prayer to our Lady taken up into Heaven, a prayer composed by the Pope himself.

6. In the definition the word, "Assumption," means a change from a state of life on earth to a state of life in heaven. The Church neither pronounces on the way Mary's body was carried to heaven nor determines to what physical laws a glorified body is subject. However, we know with certainty that there is a difference between the laws governing glorified bodies and those governing mortal bodies.

B. Concerning the theological import of the "Constitution" the following points are noteworthy.

1. The basic argument in the "Constitution" is the consent of the ordinary teaching body of the Church. With this consent clearly established, an examination is made of the manifestations of the Church's belief through the centuries.

2. The "Constitution" recognizes that the dogma has undergone development. No attention is given to apocryphal accounts nor is mention made of the absence of documents from the first centuries. Futher, nothing is said as to whether the dogma is revealed implicitly or explicitly.

3. The "Constitution" cites the testimony of the faithful through the centuries as important evidence. One of the motives impelling the Holy Father to define the dogma is that the truth of the Assumption "is deeply rooted in the souls of the faithful."

4. The "Constitution" clearly states that belief in the Assumption existed in the distant past in a way corresponding to the various stages of dogmatic development. A purely historical method is not used in the "Constitution." Rather, a theological criterion of a higher order is called on, inasmuch as the teaching of the Church is made the starting point, and the Church, as vigilant guardian of the deposit of Faith, is appealed to in the course of the explanation.

5. The "Constitution" strongly confirms the opinion that the Proto-Evangel should be interpreted as referring to Our Lady and that, when taken in its fuller sense, it contains an implicit revelation both of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption. It does not consider the two other texts (Luke 1:28 and Apocalypse 12:1) as having probative value in themselves. The Proto-Evangel, on the other hand, is spoken of as having value in itself, inasmuch as its literal meaning (as is clear from the exegesis of the Fathers) concerns Mary's complete victory and, therefore, her bodily Assumption into heavenly glory.

# Religious Anthropology

A. Roldan, S.J.

**The three chief branches** of anthropology — biological, philosophical, and religious—deal respectively with man's relations to the animal world, to creation in general, and to God. Religious anthropology draws its data from both reason and supernatural revelation.

Passing over abnormal or heterodox religious anthropologies, such as Freud's attempt to see in man's religious experience a manifestation of "libido," we will outline the religious conception of man that is given by Christian asceticism and mysticism.

Man's origin and destiny indicate his dignity. He is not "a thing flung into the world and destined for death" (existentialism); not the insignificant chance term of blind evolution (materialistic evolution); nor just another machine part of a personified State (totalitarianism). Rather, the world is made for him. Because his soul is created in God's image, man is superior to the rest of creation, even in the natural order.

But in being raised to the supernatural order by his gratuitous participation in the divine nature, man attained a still greater superiority over material creation. No longer is his destiny to know and love God by way of abstraction, but to enjoy eternally the immediate vision and love of God.

In the hypostatic union of humanity and divinity in Christ, a synthesis of the created and the uncreated, God has gone still further in showing His boundless love. This adds a new significance to man which anthropology cannot overlook.

For Christian asceticism the life of the individual man is essentially a struggle and a probation. This view of life's meaning is at the heart of religious anthropology. Man is free, and a free being must be capable of choosing his goal. Yet this freedom is mysterious, for it must be reconciled with God's omnipotent will, with the external influences that greatly limit freedom, and with the demands of society in which the free person lives.

If the fusion of angel and brute causes daily struggle in the individual man, it is not surprising that life in society involves constant clash. Humanity is a galaxy of planetary systems, each of which assumes it is the center of the universe and tries to make everything revolve around itself. Life is really a "vale of tears," essentially a warfare. However, there is no need to take a tragic view of life, since God continually supports man and rewards his efforts.

The basic concepts of liberty, of struggle, and of probation mean nothing if man cannot choose his course of conduct. There is today a deterministic tendency to stress biotype and temperament and to neglect character and the decisive role of the will. Though bodily constitution makes up the greater part of man quantitatively, it is far from being the most important qualitatively. When man faces moral crises, will is what matters. In our free will we have a source of incalculable power.

Deterministic pessimism sees in bodily constitution the cause of weakness and crime; exaggerated optimism, which is ignorant of biology, tries to force one mold on everybody. Between these two lies the true mean of Christian asceticism which centuries ago recognized

both temperamental differences and freedom to overcome obstacles.

The recognition of temperamental differences has led to different schools of asceticism, for example the Carmelite (chiefly mystic, suited to contemplatives), the Dominican (chiefly intellectualistic, with action secondary to the study of dogma), the Ignatian (chiefly voluntaristic, ordered to action). Even within each school attention is paid to individual differences.

Some remarks on conduct, character, and temperament will help us determine the relations between character and temperament and the extent to which people can change their way of life.

#### Conduct and character

1. Facts show that people are free to choose their **conduct** not just in isolated instances but habitually. It is very difficult, however, to act contrary to affective dispositions for a long time.

2. The will can also change **character.** The change is difficult, however, because character is rooted in temperament. By temperament we mean the particular bodily constitution of the individual. It is inherited with the neurohormone system and is completely operative when the organism first contacts its environment. Character, on the other hand, is the habitual attitude that the individual takes toward the world around him.

At the dawn of reason, this attitude begins to develop under the unconscious influence of temperament. It takes definite shape somewhere between the ages of sixteen and twenty when the individual takes complete stock of himself and his place in the world. Character, though rooted in temperament, can be directly influenced by the will during this period of formation. Once character becomes "set", it is subject only to indirect influences like environment, but the **manifestations** of character are still under direct control.

3. How **temperament** can be influenced is a practical question, because temperament limits the extent to which the will can shape character. Temperament in itself, as inherited, cannot be directly changed. However, the **manifestations** of temperament can be considerably influenced both indirectly and directly. Direct influence is exerted by repressing its spontaneous reactions, and even more by cultivating opposing habits.

St. Ignatius Loyola is an example to prove that such control of temperament is possible. Iron-willed and fiery in temperament, by the grace of God and long effort, he acquired such a control of his emotions that he appeared almost phlegmatic. This self-mastery did not imply any radical change in temperament; it was rather an habitual control over its spontaneous manifestations.

#### A vision of reality

The method St. Ignatius used to effect this profound change in himself—a method he then incorporated into his Spiritual Exercises—is based on his vision of reality: God's magnificent plan in creation and man's woeful rebellion against this plan. God for His greater glory had established an order in which each man was to occupy his proper place and freely follow the path laid out for him.

But in the world of the 16th century Ignatius saw a picture of desolation—decadence, sin, schism, and heresy. His aim was to reestablish the orderly plan that men either did not know or did not care to follow. His basic reasoning seems to have been: disorder means that a man does not occupy his right place; the cause of disorder is sin, especially habitual sin; the cause of sin is inordinate affection and uncontrolled instinct.

In recognizing that "the affective is the effective" Ignatius anticipated modern psychology. Since lasting reform is impossible if a person must constantly struggle against what he loves, Ignatius aimed so to change the affective dispositions that a person would be attracted to his duty. The goal of the Spiritual Exercises is to give men immersed in the material a thirst for eter-

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**The following article** is digested from the Spanish Jesuit review of ascetical and mystical theology, **Manresa,** July-September, 1950. Originally the article bore the title "Anthropoligia Religiosa: Essayo de Sintesis." Father Roldan, the author, is on the faculty of the Jesuit College of San Cugat del Valles, Barcelona. He has recently published a book, **The Problem of Evolution and the Origin of Man.**

nal values, to make the sinner a saint. To reach this goal one must remove inordinate attachments to the sinful and to the indifferent, and replace these by an orderly affection, the love of Christ.

The technique for accomplishing this can be explained best by seeing how it is applied to the most powerful of "inordinate affections", that which arises from the sexual instinct. Since the ordinary person will always react spontaneously to the lewd, the only way to overcome the inordinate attraction for sin is to develop an opposing reaction of disgust—not merely a rational repugnance such as every Christian has, but a real animal repugnance on the sense level.

But since it would be dangerous and laborious to cultivate such a reaction to all the different obscene images, Ignatius uses the simpler and surer method of developing an affective repugnance to a general "idea-image" of sin. The meditations on the pains of hell and the effects of sin are aimed at developing such an "idea-image" and instinctive repugnance. Man, however, must love and needs an ideal in which his affection can rest; Ignatius therefore strives from the very first to enkindle a positive love for Christ.

#### The second week

The second week of the Spiritual Exercises has a double and delicate task: inordinate attachments to indifferent things must be removed, for these can interfere with the accomplishment of God's plan; erroneous judgments that regard dishonor, suffering, and poverty as evil must be corrected.

Ignatius directly attacks inordinate fear of poverty, humiliation, and suffering by instructing the exercitant to pray earnestly for the grace to imitate Christ in actual poverty, humiliation and suffering. In this way the soul will gradually lose its irresistible aversion and even come to desire these things. To correct the error of judgment, Ignatius proposes long reflection and meditation. This reflection develops the conviction that, from the viewpoint of perfection, poverty and the rest are not evil, but are among God's greatest blessings.

It is not true that Ignatius neglects grace and the supernatural, which must be primary in any Christian asceticism. He knows that grace does not destroy nature but elevates and perfects it. He wants a person to prepare himself by all human means as though all depended on man, and then, having facilitated the action of grace, to pray as though all depended on God.

Mysticism too can teach a great deal about the meaning of life and the psychology of the ordinary person. Though extraordinary, it is not abnormal, and can easily be distinguished from certain pathological states that have a superficial resemblance to it.

The descriptions of mystics make it clear that the operations of soul and body are separable, for the imagination sometimes presents vivid phantasms that are distinct from the objects considered by the intelligence, and at other times this same imagination does not act at all. The same descriptions show that it is possible for the soul's higher powers to apprehend the Divine Being without any dependence on the internal or external senses.

Besides, bodily charisms like levitation give factual evidence that the glorified body is a possibility. Again, the dignity of man and the ascetical concept of probation are confirmed, since mysticism shows God's desire for union with the soul and gives a glimpse of the reward of struggle.

#### Conclusions drawn

From the view of man given by asceticism and mysticism we can draw three conclusions which at the same time serve to evaluate this new viewpoint in anthropology.

1. Christian religious anthropology gives us the most lofty picture of man. Man is not the slave of his passions but can master both the world and himself.

2. Christian religious anthropology is the most conformable to experience. It alone gives an adequate explanation of man's restless aspirations for the Perfect and the Infinite. The fact that man can adapt his conduct to suit his place in the world, and can mold his character and temperament, indicate that this view of man is based on reality and not on philosophic prejudices.

3. Christian religious anthropology shows us that Christian asceticism anticipated by several centuries, though unscientifically, the conclusions established by modern psychological research.

# New Interpretation Of Capreolus' Theory of Person

H. Degl'Innocenti, O.P.

**Fr. Francis Muniz, O.P.,** has put forth a new interpretation of Capreolus in a study entitled "El constitutivo formal de la persona creada en la tradicion tomista" (**La Ciencia Tomista,** 63 (1945), 5-89). In view of this fact, it is opportune to restudy the doctrine of the "Prince of Thomists" on the formal constitutive element of the person.

Capreolus expressly says that "person" means something positive over and above "individuated nature" and that this positive element is the act of existing which is proper to an individual nature. He arrives at this by excluding matter, form, and any kind of accident as the positive element required. It must, therefore, be the proper act of existing, for this is in the order of substance and still is adequately distinguished from essence. Hence, the suppositum is an individual substance having its independent esse. The proper esse is not one of the intrinsic constituents of the individual, but rather it is had by the individual and enters the definition of suppositum as something connoted.

The total constituent of the suppositum, therefore, is an aggregate including, as material constitutive element, the individual nature having its act of existence and, as formal constitutive element, the proper esse itself that is had by the nature. Hence the suppositum is the same as the being constituted of essence and its proper esse; and likewise the person is the complete being (constituted of essence and its proper esse) belonging to the intellectual order.

According to Father Muniz, the traditional explanation of Capreolus misinterprets him completely. The formal constitutive element of the person according to Capreolus is not, as is usually said, the act of existing proper to the substance, but is rather the individual nature as ordered to substantial existence. In this interpretation a transcendental orientation to esse takes the place of the proper act of existing as the constitutive element of the person.

(Here the author studies at length certain texts from Capreolus upon which Father Muniz bases his interpretation. Father Degl'Innocenti shows why these texts do not require any change in the traditional interpretation and goes on to point out the basic

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**In 1944** the publication of the Spanish Dominicans, **La Ciencia Tomista,** celebrated the five-hundredth anniversary of Capreolus' death with an article by Father Guillermo Fraille, O.P. The article compared Capreolus' famous doctrine on the formal constituent of the human person with that of Cajetan, and preferred that of Capreolus. The next year Father Francisco Muniz, O.P., brought out an article in **La Ciencia Tomista** to show that the well-known doctrine of Capreolus is not really Capreolus' doctrine, but a misinterpretation by Cardinal Billot.

In answer to Father Muniz' proposed reinterpretation and in defense of the common interpretation, Father Humberto Degl'-Innocenti, O.P., published an article in the July-September, 1950, issue of the **Divus Thomas,** philosophical and theological review of the Collegio Alberoni, Piacenza, Italy. It is this article that we digest here. Previous studies by Father Degl'Innocenti on the same subject appeared in **Divus Thomas** in 1940 and 1941.

flaw in Father Muniz's interpretation is his failure to distinguish the meanings of "suppositum.")

Since the doctrine on the person has theological applications, a study of the new explanation in its application to the principal mysteries of faith, the Trinity and the Incarnation, is relevant.

A. The Incarnation.—Traditional Capreolists, answering the question, "Why is the human nature of Christ not a person?" reply that His human nature lacks its proper act of existing and exists by the act of existing of the Son of God. Lacking its proper subsistence, it is not a person, but belongs to Another.

To the same question Father Muniz replies that Capreolus conceives of a transcendental orientation of the individual nature to the substantial existence. In this orientation there are: (1) the orientation itself, and (2) the term to which the orientation is directed. From this it would seem to follow that the nature itself is the formal constitutive element of the person, since the nature and the transcendental orientation are not really distinct. To say this would present a theological difficulty, for the human nature of Christ could not be separated from this transcendental orientation. How then would it not be a person? Here Father Muniz distinguishes an aptitudinal orientation from an actual one. Aptitudinal orientation is not the constitutive element of the person; it remains in Christ's human nature. Actual orientation, "the same individual substance as actually ordered by the agent to have substantial existence," is the formal intrinsic constitutive element of the person, and that orientation is not found in Christ's human nature.

Concerning this doctrine, five remarks may be made.

1. The distinction of aptitudinal and actual orientations is insufficiently explained. How can orientations identical with the nature be distinguished from each other? What is their mutual relationship?

2. The actual orientation must be either (a) an extrinsic direction of the nature to its proper esse, coming from the author of the nature, or (b) a truly transcendental orientation penetrating the whole nature. In the first supposition, the actual orientation could not explain the constitution of the person. In the second, it would have to involve an intimate change of the whole nature, making it actually instead of just aptitudinally ordered to its proper esse. A nature cannot undergo such a change and remain the same nature.

3. According to Father Muniz's opinion, Christ's human nature would have to have an aptitudinal orientation to a human esse and an actual orientation to the divine esse. However, this actual orientation would suppose a differently constituted nature from the one that is transcendentally orientated to a human esse. This nature, then, would have to be essentially different from ours.

4. The Word of God, assuming human nature, must, according to Father Muniz's principles, have assumed that actual transcendental orientation to a human esse which is identical with the nature. But that orientation is the constitutive element of the person. If the Word assumed the nature, then why is it not a human person?

5. Father Muniz produces no texts either of Capreolus or of St. Thomas to support his personal opinion concerning the role of a double transcendental orientation in explaining the mystery of the Incarnation.

B. The Trinity.—The application of the traditional Capreolist theory to the mystery of the Trinity offers no difficulties. Although Father Muniz makes no application of his interpretation, an attempt to follow his principles leads to unsatisfactory results.

We are forced to conclude that Capreolus' genuine doctrine is that the formal constitutive element of the person is the proper esse itself. We gather this conclusion from the statements of Capreolus himself, from the obvious meaning of his formulae, from the futility of looking for another interpretation in other texts, from the Capreolan distinction between the denominative and the formal suppositum, and finally from the dogmatic difficulty embarrassing the new interpretation.

# Spiritual Charisms In Saint Paul

J. Bover, S.J.

**A charism** is a grace granted not so much for the sanctification of self as for the sanctification of others. Lists of the various charisms are found in several passages in the epistles of St. Paul, notably in 1 Cor. 12:8-10, 1 Cor. 12:28-30, Rom. 12:6-8, and Eph. 4:11. St. Paul divides these charisms into three groups and relates each group to a Person of the Trinity: "Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries but the same Lord; and there are varieties of workings, but the same God" (1 Cor. 12:4-6). On the basis of this text, therefore, the charisms may be classified according to the gifts or charisms properly so-called, the ministries, and the workings.

**Gifts:** wisdom, utterance of wisdom, knowledge, utterance of knowledge, faith revelation, distinguishing of spirits, hymns, various kinds of tongues, interpretation, and gift of healing.

**Ministries:** hierarchical offices: apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers; intermediary offices: he who presides, power of administration, ministry; and beneficent services: services of help, he who exhorts, he who gives, he who shows mercy, he who gives up his life.

**Workings:** faith, miracles, and healing.

St. Paul speaks of charisms as functions in the Mystical Body of Christ: "For just as in one body we have many members, yet all the members have not the same function, so we, the many, are one body in Christ, but severally members one of another. But we have gifts differing according to the grace that has been given us . . . " and he proceeds to enumerate the different charisms (Rom. 12:4-6). He develops the same thought in Ephesians 4:7-13; and a little further he describes the charisms as hierarchic vital functions: "For from him (Christ) the whole body (being closely joined and knit together through every joint of the system according to the functioning in due measure of each single part) derives its increase to the building up of itself in love" (Eph. 4:16).

In the Mystical Body, then, the charisms are the specific activities of the different members, organic functions aimed at the progressive social sanctification of the Church. This is the fundamental principle; from it interesting consequences follow.

Social function, that is the characteristic note of the charism. But this note should not be so overemphasized as to

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"**The Spiritual Charisms in St. Paul**" originally appeared in **Estudios Biblicos** for July-September, 1950. Father Bover is a prominent Biblical scholar and formerly taught Scripture in the Gregorian University, Rome. He here presents a careful, well-documented study, including in his development of the subject an analysis of St. Paul's lists of charisms, a classification and description of the individual charisms, and a discussion of the fundamental principle of charisms as well as the consequences of this principle. While all of this material is of interest, the analysis of St. Paul's listings of the charisms and their classification and description do not lend themselves to condensation. Consequently we have digested only the latter part of the article, that concerned with the fundamental principle of the charisms and its consequences. For the complete study the interested reader is referred to the original article.

trampling on charity with their partisan quarrels. In their childishness they were excessively desirous of charisms, and precisely of those charisms which were less useful and more spectacular. St. Paul, a passionate orator, did what all orators do: he diminished one extreme, the charisms, to exalt the other, charity. And in this well-known passage he speaks hypothetically: if it were possible to have these charisms without charity, they would profit nothing. Or, if it were necessary to choose between charisms without charity and charity without charisms, there could be no doubt about the choice, for charisms without charity are valueless for eternal life.

But all this is in the realm of hypotheses and abstractions. In concrete reality, the most noble charisms—wisdom, charismatic faith, almsgiving, the offering of one's self for the good of another—are not usually separated from charity. Normally they even presuppose, or rather, they are the culmination of charity. "He loved me and gave himself up for me" (Gal. 2:20). In these words St. Paul considers the giving up of one's self the supreme manifestation of charity. This, then, is the Apostle's thought: Even without charisms, charity alone suffices. In the Mystical Body of Christ charity is the supreme vital energy, ruling and moving the charisms as subordinate energies, thus giving cohesion and activity to the whole organism and to each member. Charity is the beginning and the end of the supernatural life of Christ's Mystical Body.

#### Charisms and the hierarchy

In the history of the Church, charisms, real or imaginary, have been presented as rivals, or even as enemies, of the hierarchy. This is a falsification or an abuse of the charisms. As St. Paul teaches, God, who is equally the author of charisms and of the hierarchy, "is a God of peace, not of disorder" (1 Cor. 14:33). St. Paul teaches four truths concerning the relations between charisms and the hierarchy. First: charismatic manifestations should be subject to the direction of the hierarchy. In 1 Cor. 14:29-33 he authoritatively gives laws and norms to be followed by the prophets. Second: charisms dispose the subject for the performance of the work of the hierarchy, hence bishops exclude from charisms all powers of personal sanctification. The note, social function, is a simple mode or formality that does not absorb the whole concrete reality of the charism, just as rationality does not include the whole reality of man. Without leaving St. Paul, we can find two reasons for this contention: one from principle and the other from fact. The principle is that charisms are (at least partially) the elements which constitute the different organs of the Mystical Body and which determine their proper organic functions. But if a function benefits the whole body, it does not, therefore, cease to be of advantage to the organ which exercises it. Digestion does as much good to the digestive organs themselves as to the rest of the body. The fact singled out by St. Paul concerns the gift of tongues. This charism always benefits its possessor even when no one understands what he says. "He who speaks in a tongue edifies himself" (1 Cor. 14:4). In short, even if charisms are aimed at the sanctification of others, they are not thereby deprived of their innate power of personal sanctification.

However, this power is not equal in all charisms. Hence, the Apostle's advice, "Strive after the spiritual gifts" (1 Cor. 14:1), does not apply to all charisms in the same degree. Some charisms, like the gift of tongues or the power to work miracles, are more spectacular; it would be childish to covet them. But there are other charisms such as wisdom, faith, and the charisms concerned with service to others; everyone may desire and diligently work for these. The charism of wisdom usually comes together with the precious gift of perfect contemplation, so efficacious for sanctity. All charisms, at any rate, bring man into intimate contact with God, and this always deeply benefits the soul.

#### Avoiding a danger

A wrong interpretation of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians can easily prevent a just valuation of charisms. The magnificent praise of charity therein seems to condemn charisms. If we do not wish to give a false meaning to the Apostle's words, we must read them from his point of view. He was writing to the Corinthians, who were

are to be chosen from the charismatics (1 Tim. 3:2, Tit. 1:7-9). Third: some charisms directly pertain to the work of the hierarchy, for example, the charism of apostles, pastors, and teachers. Suarez holds that the following are also charisms the sacramental character of Holy Orders, the power of jurisdiction, papal and conciliar infallibility. For the same reason, the sacramental character of confirmation is a charism, probably the charism proper to Catholic Action. Fourth: in the vital development of the Mystical Body, hierarchy and charisms work together, ruled by charity. Charity is the energy or motive force through which the Spirit of Christ acts in the Mystical Body of Christ.

We have already seen that St. Paul divides the charisms into gifts, ministries, and workings. The gifts he relates to the Holy Spirit; the ministries, to Our Lord; and the workings, to God the Father. The relation of the ministries to our Lord is obvious from the very words "ministry" and "Lord." Those who have received this type of charism are the servants or ministers of Christ. The workings have a special relation to God the Father because, even in the intimacy of the Trinity, He is the first principle of being, of power, and of all activity. The gifts are attributed to the Holy Spirit with special appropriateness because He is the "Gift of God: Altissimum Donum Dei." But of course each group of charisms is attributed to a different Person merely by way of appropriation. All charisms, being external works of the Divine Nature, are common to all three Persons.

It is of great practical importance to realize that charisms are not limited to unusual and spectacular manifestations in the primitive period of Christianity. Charisms were never more important than now. The apostolate was never more necessary, nor has it progressed with greater leaps, than in our times. But the apostolate is designed to build up the Mystical Body of Christ. Therefore, the grace which actuates and sustains the apostolate is directed at the sanctification of others; in other words, it is the grace called charism. The present Church, no less than the primitive Church, cannot have life and progress without the charisms of the Holy Spirit.

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**Dr. Aziz Suryal Atiya,** of Farouk University, Cairo, Egypt, has announced the discovery of a new MS of the Gospels at the monastery of St. Catherine, Mt. Sinai. The discovery was made last year when the MSS of Mt. Sinai were being microfilmed by the American Foundation for the Study of Man.

The newly found MS is a palimpsest containing five layers of superimposed writing. Experts hope to be able to read the faint traces of the erased scripts by means of infra-red and ultra-violet photography. The new palimpsest has been named "Codex Arabicus."

While careful and scientific study of the MS still remains to be done, preliminary examination reveals remains of the Gospels of Sts. Matthew, Mark, and John. These, especially that of St. Mark, which may be based on a second or third century Greek prototype, are said to exhibit readings that vary from the standard text of the Gospels. Hence the newly discovered MS may afford us important information on the text of the Gospels used in the infant Church.

# Depth Psychology, Morality, And Alcoholism

J. Ford, S.J.

**The psychology** to be discussed in this paper is the psychology of the unconscious, especially the psychology of Freudian psychoanalysis and its derived systems. I have used the term Depth Psychology for lack of a better one ("Tiefenspsychologie"). We shall have to forego consideration of such important related matters as the incidental moral dangers involved in the clinical use of psychoanalysis, and concentrate on this question: Do the discoveries of psychoanalysis as to unconscious motivation in normal persons force us to the conclusion that their subjective responsibility is destroyed or notably impaired?

In order to understand the problem it is necessary to describe very briefly some of the fundamental conceptions of Depth Psychology. Freud defines in the mind three different "layers": consciousness, the subconscious or preconscious, and the unconscious. In the subconscious are stored memories that can return again to consciousness, either spontaneously or by association or at will. In the unconscious are stored memories that cannot return in these ways, but are repressed by the Censor. This repression (or resistance) is dynamic, but is not to be confused with the conscious suppression of tendencies that the mind does not wish to pursue. The repressed memories of the unconscious are constantly influencing our conscious psychic life without our being aware of it, giving rise to moods and attitudes which we are unable to account for by any conscious concept or motive, and even depriving all or most of our actions of freedom.

From his observations of mental patients, Freud constructed his theory of the Id (the pleasure principle that holds full sway in the infant), the Ego (the perceptive and executive functions that adapt the child to the physical environment that forbids his unhampered indulgence of the wishes of the Id), and the Superego (the psychic Censor that takes account of the wishes of those whose affection or approval the child craves.) The Superego comprises both the earliest inhibiting tendencies (shame, sympathy, modesty — all of them sublimated forms of the "sex" drive) and the social pressures from parents and others with whom the child comes to identify himself, and whose controlling influence, gradually interiorized as the Super-Ego, becomes the interior substitute for their formerly purely extrinsic authority.

In the Freudian system, all psychic activity, whether it be the unconscious urges of the Id, the unconscious repressings of the Superego, or the conscious activity of the Ego, is determined —by psychic causes, not the chemical or physical causes of earlier determinists.

I should like now to set forth some of the criticisms that are urged against Freudian psychology by professional psychologists and psychiatrists, both Catholic and non-Catholic. A moralist, of course, is out of his field when he tries to pass judgment on psychological theories; therefore I shall simply call attention to the fact that psychologists are by no means in agreement as to the validity of the fundamental conceptions of psychoanalytical psychology.

No less an authority on psychoanalysis than C. G. Jung criticizes the schools

both Freud and Adler for overemasizing the pathological aspect of ychic life. Gordon W. Allport of rvard University makes the same ticism of psychoanalysis in general. . Bernard Sachs calls attention to e "absurd" overemphasis of sex. Other aractristics criticized by numerous ychologists are: the failure of psychoalysts to examine the obvious conous psychic situations; their inclination to fantastic psychological constructions based on fragmentary observation (e.g. the Id, the Censor, the Oedipus complex); and their insistence on ychoanalyzing their critics rather an listening to them.

Now what is the moralist to do in e face of this situation? Must he sit wn and rewrite his treatise **De Actibus Humanis?** Is it not obvious that he ust wait until psychologists are able present a more united front on these ndamental concepts? I do believe wever that he should try to learn that he can about human motivan; and the analyst can teach him mething about that.

Although the psychologists disagree unconscious motivation, the evince for this kind of motivation is t to be despised. Consequently someng should be said about the problem liberty in the supposition that unnscious motivation is a fact.

This hypothetical problem is somehat mitigated by these two considerons: First, much of our everyday ychic activity—even of the activity the will—is not free anyway. Secdly, many of the so-called unconous motives are not really uncon-ous at all, but are **deliberately** relegated out of consciousness, or rationzed by a person who refuses to be ncere with himself.

In considering the problem itself, one thor compares the agent under the influence of unconscious motivation to an airplane pilot who is not familiar with all the workings of the machinery which he nevertheless controls. He may discover by analysis elements that contribute to the direction that the ship is taking—elements of which he was previously unaware—but though these elements were always there and always operative, he was nevertheless master of the ship. In the same way, as Dalbiez observes, the psychoanalyst can help discover which elements of the past are active in a given psychic situation, but the presence of these unconscious motives does not necessarily impair the freedom of the action.

If this is obvious to the philosopher and psychologist, it should be still more so to the Catholic theologian. The good impulses of the will in which actual grace partially consists are not necessarily present in the consciousness of the agent. The agent is aware, on reflection, of an attraction, but not conscious of the motivation. Yet under the "unconscious motivation" of efficacious grace, and under a special abundance of God's grace, the soul is free.

Psychoanalysts have a good deal to say about pseudo-virtues, apparent virtues which they tell us are really the product of retarded affectivity, infantile fixation, or unconscious instinctual drives. Let us imagine this example: Titius, an unmarried man, shuns all occasions of unchastity and in fact generally feels a repugnance to sexual stimuli. Some psychoanalysts would probably explain his chastity as the product of frigidity or infantile fixation. But does that make his chastity pseudo-virtue? The object of his conduct, its end, its circumstances are good. Does the fact that his continence is easy deprive it of the character of virtue? Underlying this idea of the another:" the general question of subjective

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**Father Ford** is Professor of Moral Theol- at Weston College, Weston, Massachuts. This article was originally written for sentation at the 1950 meeting of the tholic Theological Society of America. thin the assigned topic, "Moral Responsibility in Relation to Recent Data on Behavior," Father Ford chose for treatment subjects "not closely related to one morality in the light of Depth Psychology, and subjective responsibility in the particular field of alcoholism. The original article, unlike this digest, devotes about equal attention to each subject. It was published in the **Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting** of the CTSA (Washington, 1950) and has been reprinted as a booklet (Weston College, Weston 93, Massachusetts, $1.00).

pseudo-virtues is the determinist trend of psychoanalytic theory. We do not deny the existence of such things as compulsive neuroses that destroy liberty. But is our Titius mentally sick? Is he deprived of liberty?

Now look at his conduct subjectively —as it appears to Titius' conscience. Titius knows the difference between right and wrong; he knows that his continence is right. His choice is easy, but he is convinced that he could have chosen the contrary. Is not the testimony of his own conscience the best criterion we have of his freedom? I believe that common sense will answer in the affirmative, whether or not we concede to the unconscious considerable influence over conscious life.

### Moralists and psychiatrists

Many authors have spoken of the necessity of moralists and psychiatrists getting together. But the main problem of the moralists is one of moral responsibility in people who are mentally in good health, not in the mentally sick. It is the habit of psychiatrists to say there is no guiding line between normal and abnormal. Furthermore, psychiatrists, in this country at least, are overwhelmingly orientated toward psychoanalysis—90 per cent of them, according to Dr. David Shakow. On problems of moral responsibility, therefore, let us consult in the first place the psychologists of all schools as to the mentally well, and the psychiatrists of all schools as to the mentally ill.

My own belief is that many valuable insights into the working of the human mind have come to us from Depth Psychology. But where questions of human freedom and subjective responsibility are concerned I dare to suggest that there is more hope of enlightment in a trained and controlled system of introspection such as that devised by Father Johann Lindworsky. We can hope to find out more about freedom and moral responsibility of the normal man from the careful testimony of his own consciousness before, during, and after his deliberate acts, than we can from an analyst with Freudian presuppositions who probes the quicksands of his unconscious mind, and explores the emotional traumata of his infant years.

Alcoholism has a place in an essay which deals with psychology and morality, both because it is frequently acknowledged as a psychiatric problem, and because it is a particular exemplification of the general problem of subjective moral responsibility. But since psychoanalysis has been unsuccessful with alcoholism, we shall say no more about these matters. The first part of our essay dealt with subjective responsibility in normal individuals; it should become apparent however from the present discussion that the alcoholic is not a normal individual where responsibility for his drinking is concerned. When addiction and compulsion have set in there is a new problem of responsibility. It is no longer the problem of mere drunkenness and its morality; it is the problem of the morality of alcoholism.

### The drinker who cannot stop

For alcoholism is not the same thing as drunkenness; not even the same thing as excessive drinking; not even the same thing as excessive drinking over a long period of time. But the alcoholic is the excessive drinker who gets into serious difficulty with his drinking and who generally cannot stop drinking even if he wants to, without outside help.

In order to make the picture of the alcoholic and the insidious progressive character of alcoholism more concrete I will say a word about the phases of alcoholism and the characteristic behaviors of alcoholism, which are listed below.

Some years ago **The Grapevine**, a monthly publication of Alcoholics Anonymous, sent out a questionnaire to its subscribers asking them many detailed questions about their drinking histories. Dr. E. M. Jellinek of Yale took the data from this questionnaire and from an analysis of it described **The Phases of Alcoholism.** On the basis of this information, a tentative analysis, which is nevertheless a very illuminating study, has been made of the progressive and insidious stages of alcoholism.

Of the more than 60,000,000 people in the United States who use alcohol as a beverage, at least occasionally, one to four million may be described as alcoholics. Five out of six are men. Five

ut of six are between 30 and 55 years f age.

The drinkers who bec me alcoholics re drawn from two sources. The first lass consists of those who begin drinkng or at least begin drinking excessvely because they are trying to escape ain — pain of body, but especially ental pain and anxiety. When they ecome addicted, they are sometimes alled "primary addicts," or "primary ype of compulsive drinker." They are ore difficult problems therapeutically ecause when they have learned not to rink they still have their neurosis to ontend with.

**The second type**

The second class is sometimes called secondary addicts" or "secondary type f compulsive drinker." With this type, vhat started as apparently normal rinking gradually changes, so that, acording to Selden Bacon, "When he has chieved the full status of an alcoholic e may seem not a whit different from he primary type. . . . However, the hances of recovery are far better than or those of the primary type."

The following schematic and tentative listing of the behaviors characterstic of alcoholism is based on the orginal **Grapevine** questionnaire, a new uestionnaire by Jellinek, and personal bservation. The list is not exhaustive nd there are many exceptions and ovrlappings. Division into phases fols ows Jellinek, and personal observation. Boldface indicates outstanding characeristics.

Preparatory Phase: frequent excesive drinking (being good and tight), xtra drinks before party, sneaking rinks at party, drink to feel at ease vith others, drink to feel at ease with irls, or at a dance, **blackouts** (loss of nemory, not consciousness; drinker nay be perfectly rational in a blackut).

Basic Phase (addiction coming on): requent excessive drinking, **loss of conrol after a few drinks,** extravagant beavior (phone calls, treating, taxis), reroached by family and friends, raionalizing excessive drinking (alibis, xcuses), drunken driving, humiliating vife or husband in presence of others, eglect of sacraments, more efficient after one or two drinks, solitary drinking.

Early Chronic Phase (addiction begins): frequent excessive drinking, **morning drink** (of necessity, to get over effects of previous day's drinking), need more liquor to get same effect, antisocial acts (aggressiveness, fights, arrests), frequent missing of Mass, walk out on friends (think them snobs, stuffed shirts, etc.), friends walk out on drinker, refuse to talk about drinking, resent any mention of it, walk out on job unreasonably, resent boss unreasonably, loss of jobs, seek medical and/or psychiatric advice, persistent sleeplessness, neglect of food while drinking, indifferent to kind of beverage alcohol, go on wagon (for Lent, months, year, life), take the pledge, change pattern of drinking (only beer, only wine, etc.), pills (barbiturates), neglect of family, self-pity (everyone down on you, etc.), benders, what's-the-use attitude.

**The "hopeless drunk"**

Late Chronic Phase (addiction complete): **little or no control** ("hopeless drunk"; under compulsion at times even without previous drinking), get drunk on less liquor, persistent remorse, drinking any kind of alcohol (shaving lotion, vanilla extract, etc.), protecting supply, tremors (continued after binge and hangover), diminishing sex potency, fears (vague, indeterminate) of retribution, etc., raging, entirely unreasonable resentments, geographic escape, convulsions (rum fits), delirium tremens, hallucinations, bankruptcy of alibis and rationalizations, suicidal attempts, commitment (involuntary) to various institutions, skid row, insanity, death.

There is a good reason for believing that there is a physiological basis for the alcoholism of many alcoholics; but there is not unanimity yet among scientific men as to the existence of these bodily factors; nor have they succeeded in identifying them to everyone's satisfaction. However, we can assert with probability that alcoholism is a bodily disease in many alcoholics.

When we say alcoholism is a disease, or disorder, or sickness of a mental kind we mean that the drinking itself is to a greater or lesser degree pathologically **compulsive;** that is, the

drinker cannot help drinking, or his freedom not to drink is notably impaired. However, this does not mean that the alcoholic is always under a compulsion to drink. Circumstances may at times hold this irresistible impulse, or better, irresistible attraction, in check. And so to the question: Is alcoholism a disease? we may answer: It is a disease of the body or of the mind or of both, in the sense explained.

But I do not believe we have any adequate picture of the disease called alcoholism unless we add a third facet. Alcoholism is also a sickness of the soul. Little by little, as addiction progresses, one moral ideal after another is allowed to grow dim, and finally the alcoholic finds himself morally and spiritually bankrupt. This is true of so many that this process of moral deterioration must be considered characteristic of the condition.

**The relation to sin**

It is not surprising that a condition which so many recognize as a neurosis should also be closely related to sin and the state of sin. In the case of the alcoholic, he can be both a compulsive drinker and a sinner, his misconduct being at times the product of his compulsion and at other times of his willfulness. At all events my experience with alcoholics and their own estimate of themselves after they recover leads me to the conclusion that most of them undergo that process of moral deterioration for which they are, in varying degrees, responsible. I call this a sickness of the soul.

And if I did not believe it existed characteristically as part of alcoholism, the experience of Alcoholics Anonymous would convince me that it did. No other organization has been as effective in the large-scale rehabilitation of alcoholics as Alcoholics Anonymous. Now the central, essential program of A.A. consists of the "Twelve Suggested Steps" for recovery. And these steps are nothing but a program of moral and spiritual regeneration, a program of self-discipline and asceticism that has been compared to the First Week of the Exercises of St. Ignatius.

So I say alcoholism is a disease, a triple disease: of the body, of the mind, of the soul.

Most of the textbooks of moral theology fail to distinguish sufficiently between alcoholism and mere drunkenness. They treat alcoholism as if it were a mere habit of drunkenness, instead of as a habit which has degenerated to pathological proportions.

But even in the treatment of the mortal sin of drunkenness there seems to be an attitude that fails to grasp the mentality of the drinker. The seminarian learns that only complete or "theological" drunkenness is in itself seriously sinful; and he learns perhaps that a man is not "theologically" drunk if he can find his way home at night. There is not enough insistence, nor clear enough thought on the objectively mortal sinfulness that often accompanies lesser degrees of inebriation. And I do not believe the morality of the blackout is treated adequately anywhere. The result is that the average seminarian leaves the seminary with perhaps misleading notions about alcohol.

**Total abstinence ill regarded**

The regard for total abstinence, too, seems to have suffered a good deal of deterioration during the past thirty years. This has been due in part, I believe, to an implicit feeling among many of our priests that there is something Protestant or Jansenistic about total abstinence. Unfortunately, too, the popular mind associates total abstinence with a rigid and unbending severity in judging the drinking habits of others.

Now the fact is that the practice of total abstinence from a supernatural motive is part of the virtue of temperance. Furthermore, total abstinence societies have the warm explicit approval of the Church. They have accomplished wonders in the sanctification of their members, in reparation for the excesses of others, and, incidentally, in preventing the spread of alcoholism.

To meet the alcoholic problem the priest needs training. The pastoral counselling of alcoholics, the mistakes to be avoided in dealing with them, the strength and weaknesses of the pledge, above all the practical necessity and fruitful results of cooperating with Alcoholics Anonymous—all these are important points in the education of a seminarian today.

The general approach of the moralist to this question is already fundamentally orientated by what was said

above about alcoholism as a triple disease.

Objectively, many alcoholics are little responsible for their condition either because their addiction has a physiological basis over which they never had control, or because, as in the case of certain primary addicts, they were compulsive drinkers almost from the beginning. Again, objectively, many other alcoholics **are** responsible for their condition because it is the result of long-continued excessive drinking for which they were responsible.

But subjectively, it seems to me, not many alcoholics are mortally guilty as far as the addiction itself is concerned. Very few foresee addiction. They succeed in deceiving themselves. Add to this the general ignorance about the nature of alcoholism and the moral confusion with which the majority of them consider the question of excessive drinking itself.

### Guilt in causa

The result of all this is that, to my mind, it is a rare case where the future alcoholic sees and recognizes the danger he is in with sufficient clarity to be morally guilty **in causa** of the addiction when it finally sets in. Also, in judging the morality of the alcoholic's drinking after he has become an addict it must be remembered that alcoholism exists in varying degrees of severity and that as a result there are infinite variations in the effect it has on the voluntary choices of the drinker.

But let us first consider the objective morality of this compulsive drinking. Drunkenness remains a mortal sin. Furthermore, since a few drinks or even one drink almost inevitably leads to drunkenness or other serious sins, the alcoholic is **per se** objectively obliged **sub gravi** not to drink at all. But to tell excessive drinkers the seriousness of this obligation is, I think, in general unwise. First, because it is not easy to judge whether a person is a real alcoholic. Second, because a true alcoholic is often better left in good faith on this point. Finally, in the case of the truly compulsive drinker, even his first drink may be taken at times compulsively and so, **de facto** will not be mortally sinful for him.

To what extent is the alcoholic responsible for other sins that he commits while under the influence of liquor? Some alcoholics go on drinking for days or weeks or months without ever being "theologically" drunk, or perhaps only at the end of the day. Their sins are imputable to them, not merely **in causa** but **in se**, with a variation in responsibility according as the alcohol has sharpened or dulled their faculties. To me the remarkable thing about some of these cases is that the alcoholic, though he feels responsible for the sins committed while on a spree, does not consider himself responsible for the drinking itself.

Keeping in mind, then, the important fact that alcoholics while drinking frequently continue to have the use of reason, what is to be said of the objective imputability of their sins when they do not have the use of reason? These sins are not imputable unless they are foreseen, at least **in confuso** according to our general principles. But subjectively the alcoholic frequently does not contract this guilt because he says to himself: "This time it is going to be different; I'll take a few drinks and go home."

### Subjective morality

Finally, let us speak of the subjective morality of the alcoholic's drinking.

The following considerations lead me to assert that the responsibility of the average alcoholic for his drinking is notably diminished, that our judgment of his sins of drinking should incline toward leniency, and that there are many cases where he is not mortally guilty for becoming drunk.

The first of these considerations has already been explained: the compulsive character of the drinking. Secondly many authors think that alcoholism is a psycho-neurosis. Without any opinion on this technical point, I believe that we can usefully compare the alcoholic to the psychoneurotic where subjective responsibility is concerned, and the comparison is **a fortiori**. Thirdly, the usual impediments of human acts (ignorance, concupiscence, habit) bear upon the average alcoholic in an exaggerated way where his drinking is concerned.

And so in the absence of any general rule, except that of notably diminished responsibility in many cases, the moralist or confessor must always have recourse to the conscience of the individ-

ual alcoholic, to discover in some sort whether he has sinned grievously or not. While he is still drinking and for some time thereafter he is a poor judge, or at least an untrustworthy witness on this point. But many recovered alcoholics who have learned to look at themselves honestly make very good witnesses as to the degree of their own moral responsibility. In the end we must leave judgment to a merciful God.

Although the alcoholic may be powerless over alcohol, yet it is within his power, generally speaking, to do something about his drinking. He is therefore responsible for taking the necessary means to get over his addiction. Fortunately, today there is new hope for the alcoholic because the kind of help he needs is more and more easily available to him. He must learn to face life without any alcohol at all, ever. And Alcoholics Anonymous, because its program goes on and on as a way of life adapted to the needs of the alcoholic, can be of great help. By himself, the priest is not equipped to deal with alcoholics: the sacraments are proffered in vain to an addict not ready for them. Cooperation with Alcoholics Anonymous, other professional men, and community agencies is essential to the successful pastoral care of alcoholics.

The average person finds the indulgence of the law of his members leading him, unless checked, inexorably into the thraldom of the law of sin. The poor alcoholic, as well as many another mental sufferer, experiences within himself an exaggerated version of the same interior conflict. And they do not solve the conflict, they do not find peace of mind and peace of soul, until they surrender themselves to the law of the Spirit of life, which is the grace of God, through Jesus Christ, Our Lord.

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